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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Conceptual change 
Students' informal ideas about natural phenomena often influence their 
ability to learn science. These conceptions have been described in areas such as 
the human cardiovascular system (Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1986), electric circuits 
(Dupin & Johsua, 1987), the reflection of light (Mohapatra, 1988), and simple 
mechanics (Viennot & Rozier, 1994). Such informal ideas, also known as 
alternative conceptions, have the general characteristics of being poorly 
articulated, internally inconsistent, and highly dependent on context. Despite 
these qualities, informal ideas often have tremendous explanatory power in the 
mind of the student (Driver & Easley, 1978; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Certzog, 1982; Pines, 1985). 
Oftentimes, learners are unresponsive to traditional instructional methods 
that attempt to stimulate conceptual change. Theories have developed 
concerning specific characteristics of instruction that can effect conceptual 
change in learners. One question investigated in this dissertation is: "How can 
the implementation of instructional philosophies such as constructivism affect 
the degree of conceptual change in college science students?" Another question 
is; "Can motivational factors such as epistemological belief affect how learners 
develop conceptualizations or revise alternative conceptions?" 
These questions were explored in two separate papers within this dissertation. 
This dissertation was written in an alternative format, and is composed of two 
papers which are intended for submittal to scholarly journals. The first paper is 
a review of literature on the topics of conceptual change and the ways that 
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constructivist uses of technology can impact the degree of conceptual change in 
learners. The second paper describes an experimental study that investigates the 
effects of a constructivist instructional approach versus an objectivist 
instructional approach in facilitating conceptual change for students learning 
science. A computer simulation is the central instructional tool for this 
experiment. The effects of epistemological beliefs of learners were also 
investigated as to their effect on conceptual development and conceptual change. 
Dissertation organization 
This dissertation is written in a format that allows the two parts contained 
within to be submitted as papers to scholarly journals. The format does not 
follow the traditional dissertation "chapter" format but includes the same 
content. All references cited in the general introduction and in both papers are 
cited after the general conclusion section following the second paper. All tables 
cited in the second paper are found at the end of the second paper. Materials 
included in the appendices will not be submitted to journals with the papers. 
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1. CONSTRUCTIVIST USES OF COMPUTER 
SIMULATIONS TO ENHANCE CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
A paper to be submitted to the Journal of Instructional Development 
Mark A. Windschitl 
INTRODUCTION 
Helping students construct an understanding and acceptance of scientific 
explanations about the way the world works has been a challenge for American 
education (Champagne, 1992; Anderson & Smith, 1987). Learners hold a variety 
of alternative conceptions about natural phenomena that may actively interfere 
with the development of scientific conceptualizations (Hewson & Hewson, 1983; 
Villani, 1992; Dykstra, Boyle & Monarch, 1992). One specific area of research has 
been in the development of instructional methodologies that stimulate scientific 
conceptualization on the part of the student, causing the student to restructure or 
reject their alternative conceptions. One product of this research, conceptual 
change theory, describes how learners come to understand phenomena around 
them and how instructional interventions can reinforce or change these 
interpretations (West & Pines, 1985). The area of conceptual change is one of 
several instructional approaches within the framework of constructivism, the 
theoretical position that learners construct their own knowledge (Honebein, 
Duffy, & Fishman, 1993). 
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Related areas of research in helping students understand science better are: 
identifying how alternative conceptions begin (Panofsky, John-Steiner & 
Blackwell, 1990; Driver & Easley, 1978), identifying commonly held alternative 
conceptions (Fisher, et. al, 1986; Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1985), and developing 
assessment techniques that can effectively measure student understanding of 
scientific conceptualizations (Gutierrez & Ogborn, 1992; Stanners, Brown, Price & 
Holmes, 1983). 
In the search for ways to influence the conceptual development of learners, 
computer technologies have emerged as a possible vehicle for helping students 
learn and for effecting conceptual change (Gorsky & FInegold, 1992; Zietsman & 
Hewson, 1986). The use of computer-related technologies in instruction has 
grown substantially in the past 10 years (Becker, 1991). With the development of 
more sophisticated software and hardware, interest has been generated in the 
new ways technology can be used in instruction, particularly in the area of 
simulating scientific processes that are prone to misunderstanding by learners. 
While these some of these dynamic technologies are designed for educational 
use, they are often "administered" to students without reference to any theory-
based instructional design. There is a need for investigation into how computer 
simulations can be used in a constructivist manner to effect conceptual change. 
This paper focuses on the constructivist positions that underlie conceptual 
change theory and the nature of alternative conceptions held by science students. 
The cognitive aspects of conceptual development will be discussed as the basis 
for understanding how students develop alternative conceptions about the 
world of science and how instructional strategies can be developed to promote 
conceptual change. This paper then addresses how instructional strategies can 
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incorporate the power of computer simulations in developing 
conceptualizations and effecting conceptual change. 
BACKGROUND 
Alternative conceptions in science education 
Overview 
Substantial research has been done in the past 20 years concerning informal 
ideas about natural phenomena that students bring with them into the 
classroom. Students' informal ideas have been described in areas such as the 
human cardiovascular system (Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1986), electric circuits 
(Dupin & Johsua, 1987), the reflection of light (Mohapatra, 1988), and simple 
mechanics (Viennot & Rozier, 1994). These informal ideas have the general 
characteristics of being poorly articulated, internally inconsistent, highly 
dependent on context, and in some cases, highly resistant to change. Despite 
these qualities, informal ideas often have strong explanatory power in the mind 
of the student (Driver & Easley, 1978; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Posner, Strike, 
Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Pines, 1985). 
These informal ideas stand in contrast to the formal scientific conceptions 
that are taught as part of the curriculum and characterize the various disciplines. 
The term "scientific" refers to the characteristics of being internally consistent, 
well supported by empirical evidence, and generalizable to related contexts. A 
primary epistemological feature of scientific conceptions is that they reflect the 
authority of the scientific community— they are tentatively recognized as 
"correct" (West & Pines, 1985, p. 3). 
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Conceptual change presupposes a constructivist philosophy of both learning 
and instruction. Piaget was instrumental in developing the 20th century 
discourse on constructivism, and as cognitive psychology has evolved, the 
theory of constructivism has been elaborated and refined. A clear description of 
the philosophy begins with a contrasting ideological position, that of objectivism 
(Allen, 1992; Duffy & Jonassen, 1992). 
Objectivism 
In spite of the differences between the behavioral (learner-passive) model of 
learning and the variations of cognitive (learner-active) models of learning, both 
of these theories are essentially objectivist in nature. Objectivism holds that the 
goal of understanding is to know the entities, attributes, and relations that exist 
in the world. Scientific authorities have described and organized these entities, 
attributes, and relations that are acknowledged to exist (Lakoff, 1987, p. 159). The 
goal for the learner is to retain the "correct" propositional structures (Duffy & 
Jonassen, 1992) as described by content experts (scientific authorities) and 
curriculum designers. Set theoretic models (scientifically acceptable explanations 
of phenomena) in the various curricular areas are mapped onto the learners 
existing knowledge structure with the eventual goal being the mastery of the 
accepted knowledge. 
Objectivism acknowledges personal experience as contributing information to 
memory structures and leads to the inevitable conclusion that no two 
individuals will have identical learning experiences. The impact of prior 
experience, however, is viewed as leading to partial and biased understandings 
(Duffy & Jonassen, 1992). 
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Two further assumptions of objectivism are that knowledge exists 
independent of the knower, and that the objectivist instructor can create 
assessments focusing on mastery learning as evidence that everyone has 
acquired the same knowledge. Tests are created to measure the learner's accuracy 
of match between what they understand and the conventional academic 
understanding, with instructional methodology seen as irrelevant to the design 
of the assessments (Bednar, Cunningham, Duffy & Perry, 1992). The depth and 
breadth of understanding for students are cause for some variations in 
assessment scores, but the students' understandings must fall within accepted 
frameworks of theory to be evaluated as "correct." 
Objectivist approaches to instruction may be either learner-active or learner-
passive. Learner activity is prescribed to aid in rehearsal of information and 
attention to stimuli (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992). 
Carr et al. (1994, p. 147) describe objectivist implications for science instruction. 
They envision the instructor's position as transmissive of precise and 
unambiguous concepts from the expert to the novice. Within this context 
science is viewed as: 
• being composed of knowledge that is unproblematic, 
• having truths that are discovered by observing and experimenting, 
• providing right answers, and, 
• differentiating between correct and incorrect interpretations of the world 
in response to objective data. 
Objectivist epistemology is associated with both behavioral and cognitive 
learning theory. In both theories stimuli are presented to the learner and 
regardless of how the learner is viewed to use those stimuli, the learning 
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outcome is judged on its consistency with an accepted academic knowledge base. 
Objectivist cognitive psychology is explicit about the acquisition of information 
that exists independently of the mind, and that through application of scientific 
methodologies and logical reasoning, the learner can come to a valid and 
unbiased understanding of the world (Bednar, Cunningham, Duffy, & Perry, 
1992). 
Absent from objectivist learning theories is the involvement of personal 
meaning as connected with learning. Personal meaning is not seen as connected 
with experience, and even experience is seen as an insignificant factor in how 
learners conceptualize the world (Solomon, 1987). Two types of meaning have 
been described by Ausubel (1968). Logical meaning refers to the "meaning that is 
inherent in certain kinds of symbolic material by virtue of its very nature" (pp. 
44-45). This material is relatable on a non arbitrary and substantive basis to a 
learner's correspondingly relevant ideas. Psychological meaning is an 
idiosyncratic cognitive experience in which there is a non arbitrary and 
substantive relation of logically meaningful propositions to a particular learner's 
cognitive structure. This creates the possibility of transforming logical into 
psychological meaning during the learning process. Psychological meaning is 
related to the phenomenological position that "only in the stream of lived 
personal consciousness are the experiences to be found on which we draw for 
reflection and interpretation" (Solomon, 1987, p. 66). 
To address the complexity of meaning in intellectual growth involves 
synthesizing ideas from fields such as social psychology and linguistics. This 
avenue leads to constructivism. 
9  
The epistemological basis for constructivism 
Constructivism as a learning theory is not diametrically opposed to the 
objectivist position in every aspect. Both theories hold that there is a real world 
that individuals experience, and that this experience can influence learning, 
albeit in different ways (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992). 
A central point of departure from objectivism is the constructivist view that 
meaning does not exist in the world as an entity separate from the learner, but 
that meaning is imposed upon the world by the learner (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992). 
Meaning is directly influenced by personal experiences that are associated with 
ideas. These personal experiences may be interactions between the learner and 
the external world, or they may be products of reflection; in either case, the 
experience associated with the ideation serves as a complex indexing mechanism 
for meaning (Solomon, 1987). Piaget (1964) emphasized that knowledge is not a 
copy of reality, and his positions on knowledge production reinforce the 
endogenous nature of knowledge. Piaget held that to know an object is to act on 
it, to transform it, and to understand the nature of the transformation. 
Even the affective dimension serves to help fashion conceptions of the world; 
Claxton and Palmer (1991) noted that how we feel about what we are learning 
influences the structure of our conceptualizations, even in the abstract and 
"objective" domain of science. These ideas lead to the assumption that there are 
multiple and idiosyncratic ways to structure reality, all highly dependent on 
experiences; there is not a single "correct" view of the world. The various 
meanings that different individuals can have for concepts and propositions, 
however, are usually sufficiently similar to permit interpersonal 
communication and understanding (Ausubel, 1968). Shared meanings within a 
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culture are the bases upon which learners can compare the congruence of their 
understandings with those of others. Philosophical arguments beyond the scope 
of this paper may arise as to which conceptions may be considered "correct" or 
"incorrect". Constructivist theory does describe standards for judging the quality 
of products and processes that evidence learning, but there is a de-emphasis on 
the absolute notions of "correctness" and "incorrectness". 
These basic premises suggest that, historically, there has been a complexity 
underlying learning that has not been addressed by objectivist pedagogy. 
Additionally, the model of learning supported by constructivism is composed of 
highly integrated personal experiences that resist the somewhat fragmented view 
of knowledge proposed by objectivist philosophies (Driver, Asoko, Leach, 
Mortimer, & Scott, 1994). 
A much more context-dependent view of learning has emerged and has been 
the topic of a recent body of research. Resnick (1987) and Driver, Asoko, Leach, 
Mortimer and Scott (1994) have noted the decontextualized nature of much of 
contemporary instruction, and suggest that the lack of transfer between in-school 
learning and out-of-school learning may be due to the way in which academic 
tasks are designed. These tasks tend to be contrived, non-thematic as a group, 
and unrelated to experiences that the students have had in the out-of-school 
environment. Constructivists have emphasized that classroom learning tasks 
should be authentic, that they should correspond to realistic processes that occur 
in society, and that the results of such tasks should be held as valuable in some 
cultural context. Constructivist instruction is characterized by continual 
restructuring, modification, and adaptation of knowledge claims (Duschl & 
Gitomer, 1991). 
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Driver et al. (1994) suggest that knowledge construction as an individual 
process is similar to discovery learning, but that learners must go beyond 
personal empirical inquiry. Learners must be given access to examples of 
conventional scientific thought processes because the objects of science are not 
the phenomena themselves, but the conventional interpretations of these 
events that are promoted by the scientific community. 
It is arguable that a fundamental unit of scientific interpretation of the world 
is the conception. How the science community describes concepts is many times 
at odds with how individual learners build (construct) their own 
conceptualizations of objects and phenomena. 
Terminology of alternative conceptions 
A conception is, minimally^ a meaningful proposition. A conception can also 
be an elaborate set of interrelated propositions that is central to other ideas in the 
intellect. "Conception" is used to mark plurality and complexity as opposed to 
"concept" (Strike & Posner, 1992); a conception has also been described as a way of 
seeing something, a qualitative relationship between an individual and some 
phenomenon (Johansson, Marton & Svensson, 1985). A concept may be viewed 
as a unit of meaning that captures regularities among objects, events, or other 
concepts. Concepts are human inventions that serve to distinguish entities from 
one another and relate entities to each other. Concepts may range from the 
directly experiential such as "tree" or "book", to those at higher levels of 
abstraction, representing relationships among higher order concepts such as 
"democracy" or "ecosystem" (Pines, 1985). 
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Not all conceptions are of equal importance. To understand that "the sky is 
blue" may not be the result of or lead to expanded ideation. To grasp the 
mechanism of photosynthesis however, requires some understanding of 
chemistry and botanical anatomy. This implies a level of understanding beyond 
the declarative product of rote memorization. Connecting meaning to the 
photosynthetic process empowers the learner to use the conception for other 
explanations related to plant functions such as respiration and growth. In this 
sense, concepts and conceptions structure perception, and may be considered 
"tools of thought" (Strike & Posner, 1992). 
Learners try to establish some level of systematization as they form mental 
models (conceptualizations) of the real world that help organize and predict 
phenomena (Driver and Easley, 1978). These models are rarely elaborate or 
generalizable across contexts, but they serve to explain occurrences that the 
learner is exposed to in everyday life. Scientific explanations, with their 
characteristic rationality and generalizability are considered "correct" by content 
experts within the domain and are often at odds with the informal explanations 
of phenomena given by young learners. This discrepant condition gives rise to 
the term "alternative conception" for the learner's explanation (alternative to 
the scientific conception). 
There are many additional terms used to describe these non-scientific 
conceptions, some are ostensibly synonymous while others imply different 
characteristics about the learners' beliefs. Driver and Easley (1978) prefer the 
term alternative frameworks, citing the negative nature of other terms such as 
naive conceptions (Champagne, Gunstone, & Klopfer, 1983), children's science 
(Gilbert, Osborne, & Fensham, 1982) and misconceptions. The term 
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misconception connotes a wrong idea; research studies using this term describe 
conditions of instruction that result in an incorrect assimilation of formal 
scientific models on the part of the learner. Alternative frameworks describes 
autonomous organizations for conceptualizing experiences of the physical world 
(Driver & Easley, 1978). Novak (Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994) also offers 
the term LIPHS- an acronym for limited or inappropriate prepositional 
hierarchies. The term is based on Ausubelian learning theory and emphasizes 
the conceptual restructuring necessary for the learner to form scientifically viable 
models from an insufficient extant structure. 
Alternative conceptual frameworks are not particular to the domain of science. 
Learners may have alternative conceptions about the workings of a democracy in 
social studies, the nature of conflict in literature, differential equations in 
calculus, or the composition of jazz in music. These disciplinary examples may 
not reference natural phenomena as consistently as science, but they do involve 
highly complex and abstract sets of relationships that demand a high degree of 
conceptualization. Science as a curricular area has found alternative conceptions 
particularly problematic, partly because the nature of science is explanatory of 
natural phenomena, and also because of the vast number of concepts associated 
with all branches of science, some of which relate to everyday student 
experiences (electrical circuits, weather phenomena), and some of which are 
totally abstract or unobservable (atomic structure, solar system dynamics). 
Central to the constructivist view of learning is the experiential background 
of the learner and the multidimensional aspect of the extant intellectual artifacts 
related to these experiences. The influences of these components may help 
explain the development and nature of conceptions as well as suggest designs for 
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instruction aimed at conceptual change. Posner, Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog 
(1982) describe these intellectual artifacts and incorporate them into a 
"conceptual ecology" that influences the nature of conceptualizations. These 
artifacts are: 
• anomalies or incongruities, the particular failures of an idea to 
explain certain phenomena, 
• analogies and metaphors, allowing ideas to be understandable as they 
are mapped isomorphically onto concrete experiences, 
• the epistemological commitments of the learner including 
explanatory ideals, metaphysical beliefs, general views about 
knowledge, 
• knowledge in related fields including competing conceptions. 
• exemplars and images which are prototypical examples, and 
• past experiences. 
Strike and Posner (1992) added: 
• motivations and goals, including their institutional and social 
sources, and 
• current conceptions and misconceptions. 
The expansion of acknowledged influences upon conceptualization that go 
beyond information processing have strong implications for understanding 
learning and the design of conceptual change instruction. 
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Claims concerning alternative conceptions 
A consistent group of claims about alternative conceptions has emerged from 
the literature; Wandersee, Mintzes, and Novak (1994) have summarized these. 
The first claim is that learners have a diverse set of alternative conceptions 
with regard to objects and phenomena. This claim is rarely disputed; the 
practical implication for instruction is to identify these alternative conceptions, 
probe their nature and their sources. There are potentially unlimited 
idiosyncratic versions of conceptions about phenomena. 
The second claim is that alternative conceptions exist across age and ability. 
Alternative conceptions do seem to persist throughout all age levels, but the 
frequency of alternative conceptions vary considerably by domain of knowledge 
and quality of prior instruction. There are no consistent findings that suggest 
differences in numbers or types of alternative conceptions across ability groups 
(Wandersee, Mintzes, and Novak 1994; Placek, 1987). 
The third claim, that alternative conceptions are resistant to extinction by 
conventional instructional methods, is highly dependent upon the nature of the 
alternative conception (Wandersee, Mintzes, and Novak 1994). The most 
resistant alternative conceptions are those in the physical sciences that oppose 
counterintuitive scientific conceptions. An example of this type of scientific 
conception is the notion of forces being exerted by stationary objects (Gorsky & 
Finegold, 1992). Some alternative conceptions are simply mistaken knowledge 
such as classification errors within the animal kingdom, which although playing 
a central role in other related conceptual structures, simply involve naming 
conventions. 
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Another claim with implications for classroom practice is that there are 
instructional strategies that can facilitate conceptual change. Conceptual change 
strategies are comprised of a diverse and eclectic set of approaches that share a 
basic assumption: students come into learning environments with prior 
understandings of how the world works and the role of the teacher is that of 
change agent (Wandersee, Mintzes, and Novak 1994). A more comprehensive 
description of conceptual change strategies is addressed in a later section. 
Alternative conceptions in science 
This section will provide an overview of alternative conceptions within the 
fields of physics, chemistry, and biology. 
There is considerable variance in the nature of alternative conceptions held by 
science students that have been identified for study. Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, & 
Gamas (1993) describe a list of alternative conceptions from "wild animals are 
always ferocious" (Gordon & Rennie, 1987) to belief in creationism (Lawson & 
Weser, 1990; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992). Guzzetti et al. add that there are 
differences between mistaken knowledge and alternative ideas that represent an 
entrenched belief; thus it is possible to know the theory of evolution without 
believing it. 
Within the field of physics, simple mechanics have generated the most 
research with regard to alternative conceptions. Most students hold a 
commonsense belief about moving bodies that combines Aristotelian and 
impetus theories of motion (Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994; Hewson & 
Thorley, 1989; Dykstra, Boyle, & Monarch, 1992; Gutierrez & Ogborn 1992). In 
general terms, the misconceptions center around the idea that motion implies 
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force. This erroneous idea is often elaborated by students when they claim that, 
under the influence of a constant force, objects move with a constant velocity 
(Brown & Clement, 1987). Other topical areas prone to alternative conceptions 
are electrical current and how it flows through circuits (Carlsen & Andre 1992; 
Hargrave 1993; Shipstone, 1988; Dupin & Johsua, 1987), and the laws of light 
reflection (Mohapatra, 1988). 
Within the field of chemistry, Fensham (1994) describes several alternative 
conceptions that appear to be common across age and experience groups. The 
general categories of misconception are: that there is a continuous or non-
particulate composition of substances, believing in additive rather than 
interactive models of how chemicals react with one another, and viewing 
chemical equilibrium as a non-dynamic state in which no chemical reactions 
occur. He claims that traditional teaching and assessment fail to challenge these 
misconceptions and students may persist in maintaining the misconceptions, 
still performing well in testing situations. 
Most research in alternative conceptions in biology can be organized into five 
groups: concepts of life, animals/plants, the human body, continuity principles 
of reproduction, and genetics/evolution (Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). 
The emergence of the concept of life is an example of the developmental 
aspect of conceptions and misconceptions as described by Piaget (Mintzes, 
Trowbridge, Arnaudin, & Wandersee, 1991; Inhelder, 1969). From ages three to 
seven, life is ascribed to any object exhibiting activity such as a noisy toy or 
kitchen appliance. From ages seven to eight, movement becomes the essential 
quality for defining life (a car in motion or a thrown ball). In the third stage, 
approximated by the years 9 to 11, children ascribe life to things exhibiting 
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spontaneous movement (the wind, the sun or moon). At about 11 to 12 years of 
age, children restrict their identification of living things to plants and animals. 
Carey (1985) examined the explanations of life processes given by 4, 6, and 10-
year olds, and found that their reasoning followed an intuitive theory of human 
behavior. The youngest were asked for explanations of life processes such as 
breathing, eating, and sleeping. They consistently ascribed these activities to 
social and psychological needs. By age 10, students possess their own domain of 
"intuitive biology" which parallels the understandings held by naive adults. 
This supports the assumption that, if left unchallenged, alternative conceptions 
may persist throughout life. 
Mintzes, Trowbridge, Arnaudin, and Wandersee (1991) surveyed 1,400 
students in grades 5, 8, 11, and college sophomores about photosynthesis and 
nutrition in plants. About half the college sophomores claimed that a plant's 
food comes from soil. Fewer than 10% of the respondents described plants as 
making food from carbon dioxide. When questioned about the role of the leaf in 
plant biology, the majority of respondents at all grade levels suggested that the 
leaves make food (a correct response). The apparent conflict between the 
students' belief that soil furnishes food, and their responses that leaves make 
food, highlights the preservation of contradictory ideas by students. Other 
common misconceptions regarding plants are that: fertilizer is "food" for plants, 
chlorophyll is plant "blood", gases are not involved in making food, 
photosynthesis creates protein, and plants change water into sugar. 
Classification of living things is another process that learners of every age 
show difficulty in understanding. An exercise in animal identification by 
Mintzes et al. (1991) revealed that the sample of students mentioned above could 
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correctly identify a cow and a seagull as animals, but with the exception of college 
biology majors, a quarter of the respondents failed to identify the fish and a third 
failed to identify the butterfly as animals. No respondents included a pine or 
mushroom as animals. Other related findings in this study showed that the 
view of "animal" is erroneously restricted by distinctions such as the presence of 
appendages, being terrestrial, having a backbone, or having fur. 
The human cardiovascular system is an example of a subject which involves 
structures and processes that are not readily observable, but assumptions are 
made about it by young learners when they experience related subjective 
phenomena (feeling the heartbeat, noting patterns of breathing, seeing blood 
from cuts, feeling the warmth of the body). Cardiovascular concepts are 
particularly vulnerable to the three major influences on misconceptualization: 
physical interactions with the environment, interactions with peers or the 
media, and formal instruction. 
Mintzes, Trowbridge, Arnaudin, and Wandersee (1991) questioned students in 
5th, 8th, and 10th grade, as well as college freshmen/sophomores about the 
cardiovascular system. About two-thirds of the elementary students described 
blood as a red liquid. In the higher grade levels, the idea of cells suspended in 
this liquid emerged. Older students apparently assimilated the ideas of cells into 
their intuitive notions of blood as a red liquid; this particular explanation 
accounted for more than half the college-age responses. When asked to explain 
why blood is important to the body, most younger students and about half of the 
high school students gave naive reasons such as "keeps you alive" or "keeps you 
going." Older students showed a greater accuracy of scientific explanation as they 
identified the blood's role as transporting oxygen and nutrients. The 
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respondents were also queried about the anatomical construction of the heart. 
When asked to select from several illustrations which heart was most like their 
own, a three-chambered amphibian heart was selected by about 40% of 
elementary students. This model was selected by at least one quarter of all 
students regardless of grade level. Few students among those who chose the four 
chambered heart as a model could explain the significance or function of the 
chambers. This finding supports the assumption that anatomical knowledge has 
limited connection with a broader functional conceptualization of how the 
circulatory system works. 
Conceptual change 
Overview 
There is no well articulated theory that describes the substantive changes in 
the process by which individuals' central, organizing conceptual frameworks are 
replaced by another set of beliefs which are incompatible with the first (Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). It is commonly held that learning is the 
interaction between what a person is taught, and what he/she already possesses 
as conceptual structures. The nature of these interactions is complex even for 
simple learning. A conceptual change model of instruction is one of a group of 
four constructivist approaches listed by Duschl and Gitomer (1991), the others 
are: the learning cycle, the generative learning model, and the use of analogies 
and analogical bridges. The conceptual change model is based on the theoretical 
positions described below. 
Many researchers in the area of conceptual change express a fundamental 
commitment that learning is a rational process (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & 
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Gertzog, 1982) and that people strive to make sense of the natural world 
(Hewson, 1981). Posner et al. have drawn parallels between the historical 
development of scientific thought and the personal intellectual change a learner 
experiences as conceptualizations are formed. Science has central commitments 
or paradigms that serve as a framework of "truth." This framework helps define 
problems, describe strategies for addressing these problems, and perhaps most 
importantly, suggest what will count as viable solutions (Kuhn, 1970). When 
science recognizes new evidence that fits within the boundaries of existing 
theory, that theory may be modified or added to. When science is faced with 
challenges to the basic assumptions upon which all research is based, deliberate 
inquiries must be made, and if the new idea demonstrates more explanatory and 
predictive power, it replaces the old paradigm. An example is the Copernican 
view of the universe and how the heliocentric theory explained celestial 
movement with greater accuracy than the Ptolemeic design. A more modern 
example is Einstein's theory of relativity which did not replace as much as 
subsume Newtonian physics. 
Posner et al. asserts that analogous patterns exist in conceptual change in 
learning. If an individual is confronted with a new idea and the 
conceptualization of that idea is reconcilable with other existing ideas, then the 
individual is likely to assimilate (Piaget, 1964) the idea (an evolutionary change). 
Assimilation is the recognition that a physical or mental event fits into an 
existing conception and the consequent elaboration of that conception brought 
about by the new information (Dykstra, Boyle, & Monarch, 1992). This 
recognition also involves the purposeful ignoring of features not deemed salient 
to the assessment of the events. If the learner's current schematic structure fails 
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to allow her/him to grasp new phenomena at all, then accommodation (Piaget, 
1964) may take place (a revolutionary change). Accommodation is a radical 
replacement of beliefs that are central to the way an individual systematizes and 
explains the world. The terms assimilation and accommodation were 
introduced by Piaget in his work with the conceptual development of children. 
Other terms cited in literature are Hewson's (1981) conceptual capture 
(analogous to assimilation) and conceptual exchange (analogous to 
accommodation). 
Posner et al. clarify one aspect of accommodation that has been 
misrepresented in the past. Accommodation as a flash of insight or wholesale 
revision of beliefs is an oversimplification. A student will be more likely to 
adopt some aspects of a new conceptualization while retaining some features of 
the previously held belief. Each incremental adjustment to conceptualization 
may set the stage for the next, and there is the possibility of reversion in whole or 
part to original ways of thinking. 
The conceptual change model of learning contrasts with the position of 
science learning as memorization of new information and skill-building. The 
conceptual change position is that learning science consists, in part, of a series of 
revisions in the conceptualizations learners use to organize acquired 
information and skills. In accordance with this view, science education should 
be designed to facilitate such changes. Several theorists have proposed 
conceptual change models that have direct applicability to instruction in science. 
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Conditions for conceptual change 
Instructional conditions that promote conceptual change can be described as 
follows (Posner et al., 1982; Hewson, 1981; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Hewson & 
Thorley, 1989): 
1) There must be dissatisfaction with an existing conception. This can 
occur when a conception cannot be reconciled with new experiences (anomaly) 
or when the conception violates some epistemological criteria (this refers to 
inelegance, being unnecessarily complex, or diametrically opposing a 
metaphysical belief). 
The remaining three conditions describe how the learner views the candidate 
conception (new conception) and how "satisfaction" with the new conception 
may be realized. 
2) The new conception must be intelligible. The learner must be able to 
conceive of the new idea using existing structures even though the new idea 
may be at odds with existing patterns of explanation. This new conception must 
be internally coherent. If this condition is not met, the learner has no option but 
to internalize the conception through rote memorization, which means there 
are no propositional linkages formed and reconciliation with existing schema is 
moot. Many science concepts are unintelligible for one reason or another to the 
learner, and although some direct instruction is necessary to familiarize the 
student with the content (Anderson & Smith, 1987), objectivist-dominant 
instruction can promote the unconnected rote memorization of information. 
3) The new conception must be plausible. This point touches upon the 
rationality of conceptual change theory. The learner must be able to envision a 
world in which this new model of phenomena can operate without 
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contradiction. This presupposes that the new model is intelligible, but 
intelligibility is not sufficient. The new conception must also fit in with personal 
standards of knowledge. Specious conditions of plausibility are generated when 
the classroom learning environment emphasizes authoritarian epistemology. 
Students may be socialized to believe that the "teacher is always right" or authors 
are infallible, thus ideas directly transmitted from those sources carry a 
predetermined level of plausibility. This imposed plausibility is not necessarily a 
rational influence, and is not the result of intellectual deliberation on the part of 
the learner. 
4) The new conception must he fruitful. The candidate conception should 
have the power to solve problems or predict phenomena more decisively than 
the conception it will replace. The candidate conception should be applicable 
across a range on contexts, and, with some guidance, a learner should be able to 
demonstrate transfer to related situations in which the new conceptualization is 
appropriate. Conditions in the world which were not reconcilable with previous 
conceptions may now be interpreted with coherence by an accepted candidate 
conception. 
A revised theory of conceptual change 
The above conditions describe what may be necessary for a rational acceptance 
of a new theory (conceptualization) by learners. A revisionist theory of 
conceptual change is offered by Strike and Posner (1992) in which they suggested 
modifications are needed in their earlier conceptual change theory. 
The first element of their self-critique questions the existence of well-formed 
preconceptions that are symbolically expressed, and the notion that such 
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preconceptions may be replaced in their entirety by correct scientific conceptions. 
Strike and Posner suggest that novice learners have iconic or enactive (Bruner, 
1966) representations of how the world works. These are not explicit linguistic 
descriptions, but mental "images" of phenomena that may provide the intuitive 
basis for understanding the world. Consider the intuitive, anthropomorphic 
language associated with movement of inanimate objects. Young learners grow 
up with a vague belief that moving objects (a thrown ball for example) have a lot 
of energy; "they want to climb" and then "tire out" and fall. Miscellaneous 
popular jargon creates imagery that members of the culture use to form ideas 
about movement and energy that may not be scientifically correct. These are not 
well articulated beliefs, but they contribute to the way the learner prefers to see 
the world. Learners may also generate conceptions spontaneously in the 
instructional setting when asked to envision or explain phenomena the have 
not previously considered. Thus preconceptions are occasionally emergent 
artifacts of the classroom environment, not preformed in the intellect. This 
serves to further differentiate the scientists' paradigms from conceptual 
development in learners in the lack of clearly stated, symbolically expressed (i.e. 
in words, numbers, operations) conceptualization on the part of the individual 
learner. Strike and Posner also argue that these preconceptions, however well 
formed, have a developmental history, and that revealing that history may be 
more important than understanding the character of the misconception itself. 
Common metaphorical language is cited as a powerful influence on students' 
beliefs about phenomena, and singling out this aspect of the conceptual ecology 
may serve to expose misconceptions more than confronting learners with 
anomalies produced by their misconceptions. 
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Another point of revision for Strike and Posner is that conceptions were 
originally seen as cognitive objects that were affected by components of the 
conceptual ecology. Their view now is that conception and misconceptions 
serve as part of the ecology and that they influence, in turn, the metaphors, 
anomalies, knowledge, and other parts of the ecology. 
Another clarification by Strike and Posner is that their original theory is 
overly rational. The original theory had been criticized (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 
1993) for failing to consider the forces of motivational beliefs of the learner such 
as goals, purposes and intentions. Language in the original theory described 
learners as logically weighing the consequences of accepting one explanation 
versus another. The assumption was that school children seek to resolve 
discrepancies between their conceptions and natural phenomena as a primary 
goal of intellectual activity. In reality, children often resolve their 
misconceptions with the goal of receiving a good grade (this goal is not always 
congruent with gaining a scientific set of conceptions), preserving self-esteem in 
a intellectually overwhelming situation, or bringing closure to a learning 
situation at any cost. Intellectual engagement as a game or academic hurdle 
(Villani, 1992) rather than the pursuit of understanding, fosters these types of 
non-scientific ways of resolving misconceptions. 
Some authors have elaborated on the possibility that motivational beliefs 
(goals, values, self-efficacy, and control beliefs) play a major role in conceptual 
change (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; West & Pines, 1983; Dweck, 1986; 
Entwistle, Entwistle & Tait, 1993). A "cold" or overly rational model is 
contrasted to one which not only includes individuals' beliefs, but also the 
classroom context, and the nature of the interactions between the students and 
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the teacher. Students have many social goals such as making friends, besting 
others, or impressing the teacher. These goals, not directly associated with 
learning, result in surface processing and less intellectual engagement. This 
surface processing is reinforced by traditional forms of education which 
emphasize the acquisition of incremental, decontextualized knowledge 
(Entwistle, Entwistle & Tait, 1993). 
Epistemic motivation has been defined as one's beliefs toward knowledge and 
the process of building knowledge (Boyle, Magnusson, & Young, 1993). 
Kruglanski (1989, 1990) suggested that a learner's motivation toward knowledge 
as an object (epistemic motivation) influences knowledge acquisition. Dweck 
(1986) suggests that children who believe intelligence is a fixed trait tend to focus 
their efforts toward gaining favorable judgments of that trait (performance goals) 
and shy away from challenging academic situations. Children who believe 
intelligence can be cultivated orient themselves toward developing that quality 
(learning goals) and seek challenging intellectual situations as well as deeper 
understandings. 
Various styles of instruction play a subordinate role to the effects of 
opportunity and motivation on student learning (Perkins & Simmons, 1988). 
Scientists, as members of a learning community, internalize the goals of 
systematizing knowledge and refining theories, but this is not the orientation of 
most of the students in the classroom. Theories that base conceptual change on 
parallels between the two bodies of learners neglect (among other conditions) 
differences in motivation. 
West and Pines (1983) argue that non-rational components are intrinsic to 
conceptual change. The non-rational aspects of intelligibility, plausibility, or 
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fruitfulness are not simply affective predispositions to conceptual change, but are 
part of what learning is. The feeling of power in identifying, explaining, and 
predicting is part of the learning process, as are the pleasurable aesthetics of 
balance and harmony in reason. Accepting the fruitfulness of a new conception 
implies value judgments about the new conception as well as goals as to how the 
new conception will help solve certain classes of problems (Boyle, Magnusson, & 
Young, 1993). These motivational characteristics are part of the process of 
conceptualization, but Strike and Posner (1983) caution that categorizing factors 
influencing conceptual change into rational and non-rational would add 
confusion to the research field. Basing acceptance of certain conceptualizations 
on aesthetic or moral grounds may seem irrational to the scientist, but perfectly 
well-founded to certain types of learners. 
Strategies for promoting conceptual change 
In a general sense, some conceptual change strategies focus on externalizing 
(exposing) the learner's knowledge structure, then modifying it. Other strategies 
emphasize the need for self-monitoring and controlling the events of learning. 
Anderson and Smith (1987) list three features of successful conceptual change 
instruction: presenting direct refutation to student misconceptions, immediate 
application of scientific conception to explanation of phenomena, and explicit 
emphasis with repetition. 
Research from reading education has been critical of the list-like fashion in 
which information is presented in basal readers, as well as the excess of content 
material (Guzzetti et al., 1993). Based upon these criticisms, researchers have 
used alternative types of text or text-based strategies that provide a refutation of 
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commonly held misconceptions. The elements of surprise or incongruity are 
essential in initiating a conceptual change process; these are incorporated into 
explanations that prove the alternative conception untenable while at the same 
time giving supporting evidence for the scientific conception. In a metanalysis 
of conceptual change strategies in reading and science education, all variations of 
refutational text when used as a single intervention were more effective than 
any form of non-refutational expository text. Some of the variations of 
refutational text included expository versus narrative, and student choice-of-
study strategy versus a no student choice-of-study strategy. The metanalysis also 
concluded that it was effective to use text in combination with other strategies 
that produce cognitive conflict (Guzzetti et al., 1993). 
Concerning science education studies, the metanalysis by Guzzetti et al. 
identified three approaches that had the greatest effects on conceptual change: 
The Learning Cycle, bridging analogies, and conceptual conflict. 
The Learning Cycle is an instructional approach, not an individual strategy. It 
has been used in studies on concept acquisition, and has recently been modified 
for use in the area of conceptual change (Lawson & Weser, 1990; Lawson & 
Worsnop, 1992). In the first phase, it allows students to learn through discovery-
type experiences with little guidance from the instructor. The second phase calls 
for the organization of the information gathered in the first phase, refining 
patterns identified, and using discussion, text or other media to link student-
discovered patterns with a scientific concept. The third phase of the cycle 
requires the student to extend their knowledge by abstracting their application 
from concrete examples, and generalizing a concept to other applications. A 
modification of the cycle includes the addition of a predictive phase in which 
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students are asked to predict outcomes as they engage in experimentation 
(Guzzetti et al., 1993). 
Bridging analogies link a known example of a concept to an unknown 
example. After a diagnostic test to identify particular misconceptions, the 
instructor identifies student-held beliefs that have some approximate consistency 
with the scientific conception. These beliefs are used as anchoring points for 
helping students make sense of conceptions using their own intuitive 
experience. A skilled teacher can generate focused discussion on how the 
anchoring examples (a product of personal experience) and target examples 
(scientific conception) are similar or dissimilar (Guzzetti et al., 1993). 
The conceptual conflict strategies are strongly associated with the 
constructivist approach to learning. They are premised on the idea that learning 
science is a complex process in which the learner's conceptions interact with new 
information. The model of conceptual change by Posner, Strike, Hewson, and 
Gertzog (1982) holds that learners must have dissatisfaction with their 
conception's ability to be reconciled with scientific conceptions or observations of 
natural phenomena. If this dissatisfaction exists or can be generated by examples 
of incongruity, the potential exists for some type of conceptual change. This 
approach is more theoretical in nature and overlaps the previous strategies in 
theoretical base and practical application. Hewson and Hewson (1983) identify 
four possible strategies within this theoretical framework: 
• integrating students' existing conceptions with scientific conceptions, 
• differentiating existing conceptions into separate but more clearly 
defined conceptions to show the students that their alternative ideas are 
not plausible in related situations (not generalizable). 
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• exchanging the entire alternative conception for the scientific 
conception after demonstrating the explanatory and predictive power of 
the scientific conception, and 
• conceptual bridging (described as bridging analogies above). 
The metanalysis of Guzzetti et al. summarizes the effective conceptual change 
methods as all producing some form of cognitive conflict. Teaching practices 
that challenge existing understandings, cause students to face contradictions and 
recognize counterexamples appear to facilitate conceptual change. 
THE USE OF COMPUTER SIMULATIONS IN INSTRUCTION 
Introduction 
During the past decade, the number of microcomputers in U.S. schools has 
increased nearly 50-fold (Becker, 1991). The proliferation of computer-related 
technologies available for instruction has prompted investigation of their 
influence on learning and achievement, including the processes of conceptual 
development and conceptual change. There is general consensus that computer-
based instruction can result in moderate achievement gains in students in a 
variety of classroom contexts (Kulik, Bangert, & Williams, 1983). There are, 
however, well founded arguments that resultant differences in learning from 
computer-based instruction may be attributed to uncontrolled effects of different 
instructional methods, content, or novelty (Clark, 1985). As the body of research 
in this area grows, it is becoming evident that the larger instructional setting in 
which computer-related technologies are employed should be considered as 
important as the specific types of computer programs used. 
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Among types of computer applications (word processing, databases, 
spreadsheets, hypermedia, communication software and others) simulations 
seem to offer strong potential as agents in contributing to conceptual change. 
The ability of simulations to portray phenomena and allow users to interact with 
the dynamics of a model system create an arguably unique way of helping 
learners conceptualize phenomena. 
Overview 
"Pictures, graphs, models, analogies, and metaphors have one thing in 
common. All can be used as tools to help understanding" (Snir, Smith, & 
Grosslight, 1988, p. 4). Educators use models as tools for helping students 
understand a process or thing. A model acts as a metaphor for the student to 
access something that is less well known by comparing it to something that is 
more familiar. Snir et al. (1988) describe two types of models that are used in 
instruction: the object-attribute model which resembles the object modeled in 
some aspect of its basic appearance (a physical model of the solar system for 
example), and relational models in which different elements of the model have 
the same systemic pattern of relationships as that which is being modeled (as in a 
mathematical model of photosynthesis mechanisms). Object attribute models, 
such as pictures and scale models do not attempt to map relationships between 
elements in the model other than isomorphisms such as color, shape, proximity 
to other elements. A model of an car engine is limited, therefore, to an 
anatomical inspection by students who need additional information to 
understand how it actually operates. Relational models, by contrast, can show 
qualitative and quantitative relationships between elements. These 
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relationships are usually theoretical entities that are expressions of patterns of 
regularity. From these types of models, inferences and deductions can be made 
about the model and the referent system. Children who set up an aquarium may 
observe relationships among the different species of fish, and between the fish 
and their environment. This can be viewed as a limited model by which they 
may infer about relationships in real aquatic systems. Although there is 
evidence that young students have difficulty grasping relational metaphors 
(Centner, 1988), this ability seems to develop somewhere between 7-10 years of 
age. Relational models may also act as object-attribute models if components of 
the model resemble the parallel component in the referent system. 
A simulation is a dynamic execution of the processes within a relational 
model system. Although a computer is not necessary to create a simulation, the 
technology creates powerful possibilities for the representation and 
manipulation of relational model systems. Thomas and Hooper (1991, p. 498) 
describe a simulation as: "... a computer program containing a manipulable 
model of a real or theoretical system. The program enables the students to 
change the model from a given state to a specified goal state by directing it 
through a number of intermediate states. Thus, the program accepts commands 
from the user, alters the state of the model, and when appropriate displays the 
new state." 
There are computer simulations of solar systems, photosynthesis, the 
cardiovascular system and many more. One advantage of a computer-based 
simulation is the ability to make normally unobservable occurrences plainly 
visible for the student. These may be processes that: 
• take place over a long period of time such as continental drift. 
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• take place too quickly to be grasped in real time such as engine cycles, 
• are microscopic such as viral reproduction, 
• are macroscopic such as astronomical motion, or 
• have many complex sub-processes such as photosynthesis. 
Additionally, real systems are often filled with non-relevant information, adding 
a distracting element to the cognitive load of understanding the concept. In a 
review of visual research, Dwyer (1978) notes that for young learners especially, 
the addition of too much detail in visuals hinders the ability to sort out relevant 
details. Computer-based simulations can eliminate (within limits) extraneous 
information. Simulations can also employ perceptual cues (also referred to as 
process highlighters) that draw the learner's attention to critical features and 
events that are functionally invisible. These may be visual cues such as flashing 
text or color coding, or they may be audio cues such as a "beep" or digitized 
speech. Perceptual cues are not particular to computer-based media, but they 
have been positively correlated with student understanding of computer-
simulated environments (Chandler & Chaille, 1993). 
Computer simulations can also show multiple representations of the same 
phenomena simultaneously. The constructivist position that students should 
have access to multiple viewpoints and representations for information is 
partially satisfied by well-constructed simulations. One commercial 
cardiovascular simulation (Explorer's"'''^ Cardiovascular System) has been 
designed to display several windows of pictorial and quantitative information 
simultaneously. The windows show an active human figure, a pumping model 
of the heart, full-body circulatory motion, and the user's choice of graphical 
readouts of blood pressure, stroke volume, heart rate, etc. These readouts can be 
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in the form of line graphs, pie charts, or digital counters. The processing speed of 
today's microcomputers enables these complex representations to be displayed to 
the learner, this condition being much advanced from the austere 
representations provided by previous generations of available classroom 
computers. 
There is the potential for distraction when students have many choices 
within simulations (Carlsen & Andre, 1992), but the ability of the user to choose 
any combination of these representations allows them preference in observing 
and internalizing representations of relationships among phenomena. 
Due to the nature of how information is entered, stored and represented in 
the digital medium, important limitations exist in computer modeling of reality. 
Model systems that have a logico/mathematical structure of organization are 
fragmented and programmed into the software in the discrete manner necessary 
to the medium. These equations are then stored as potentialities for later 
display. Physics simulations are easily created in this sense because of the 
inherent quantitative nature of the domain. This allows for the 
rapid/continuous display of certain types of information in reaction to user 
choices, because the computer is designed to handle just these types of 
calculations. 
A more challenging test of simulation fidelity to real world phenomena is the 
area of complex qualitative relationships more common to the social sciences. A 
simulation may be employed in a teacher education class that allows users to act 
as teachers in a simulated classroom and select certain decision paths in response 
to phenomena in the classroom. The complexity of the qualitative interactions 
among children in classroom is artificially fragmented and quantified to make 
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the simulated environment amenable to programming (Bowers, 1988). These 
types of simulations contain a multitude of separate screens that "branch out" to 
one another depending on parameters in the environment. These screens must 
be predetermined by experts to allow the simulations to have any validity at all, 
but the result is ultimately reductionist in nature. 
A concept related to simulation is that of microworld. Reiber (1991) 
describes a microworld as the "simplest model of a domain that is deemed 
accurate and appropriate by an expert" (p. 3), and "offers an initial point of entry 
which matches the user's cognitive state to allow fruitful interactions to take 
place" (p. 4). An example of a microworld might be that of a planet's surface in 
which a student can set the limited parameters of gravity and atmosphere, then 
observe how a game of baseball might take place on that planet (Dede, 1987). 
Simulations, according to this definition attempt to model reality more closely 
than microworlds and include many of the actual objects and relationships 
found in the referent system. 
The distinctions between simulations and microworlds are not always clear, 
and the two concepts overlap considerably. Comparisons between microworlds 
and simulations as to the possible types of learning effects caused by each is 
lacking. The term computer simulation will be used then, in the broadest sense 
in this paper. 
General instructional uses of simulations 
As with many computer based learning tools, much of the early research on 
simulations focused on whether or not students could learn from them. 
Simulations were compared in their effectiveness to non-computer based media 
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or no instruction at all. This media comparison approach has been superseded 
by a more sophisticated set of questions dealing with the larger theoretical 
framework of instructional design. Research on how and when simulations are 
used with respect to other elements (didactic instruction, collaboration, lab 
experiences, assessment) in instruction is helping to clarify how simulations can 
be used for maximum effect in the classroom. 
In a review of simulation research, Thomas and Hooper (1991) developed a 
useful taxonomy of uses for simulations and evaluated the effectiveness of 
simulations with respect to these uses. Their first category, experiencing, 
describes cases in which simulations precede formal instruction, and are used to 
set the stage for future learning. Experiencing is useful for providing 
motivation, providing concrete examples, providing an organizing structure, 
and exposing misconceptions. Brant, Hooper and Sugrue (1991) found that using 
a genetics simulation in this way (prior to formal instruction) resulted in 
significantly higher achievement than using the same simulation after formal 
instruction. 
The second taxonomic category is informing. This use of simulations is 
simply for the delivery of information, and few learning benefits were found for 
students using simulations in this manner as compared with the use of 
computer tutorials, or direct instruction. 
The third category, reinforcing, is described as the strengthening of learning 
objectives. The criteria for simulations classified as being used for reinforcing is 
that they direct the student to apply existing knowledge in the same context it 
was learned. As with informing, few learning benefits were found for students 
using simulations in this manner 
3 8  
Integrating, the fourth category, is the use of simulations to assimilate isolated 
bits of information into functional units, and to promote the reorganization of 
learned material. Simulations used in this way were found to be beneficial in 
identifying and understanding problems. 
Thomas and Hooper summarized their findings by saying that the effects of 
computer simulations are not revealed by tests of knowledge but by tests of 
transfer and application. Using simulations to give initial exposure to students 
about a concept (experiencing) and using simulations to integrate knowledge and 
stimulate problem solving behaviors (integrating) seem to be the two most 
promising classroom applications. 
Constructivist uses of technology 
As learners try to systematize their understanding of phenomenological 
relationships, they may profit from judicious didactic instruction (Klausmeier, 
1961), but the complex picture of the conceptualization processes emerging from 
research indicates that learners create their own idiosyncratic webs of knowledge 
that are highly dependent on their backgrounds. Further, these individualistic 
backgrounds develop along lines of intellectual propensities particular to that 
learner. Learners are adept at different symbol systems such as language-based, 
logico-mathematical, or iconic (Gardner, 1993 & 1994); also, learners have 
different learning styles, and can have vastly different motivations for doing 
tasks (Pintrich et al., 1993; Schommer, 1993a & 1993b). A constructivist 
application of a well-designed simulation allows the learner to choose their 
mode of informational representation on the computer screen; it allows them to 
develop hypotheses about phenomena that are accommodative of their way of 
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solving problems. This is not to say that there is no place for the prescriptive in 
instruction. Unguided inquiry, especially using computer simulations can be an 
exercise in futility for the student (Rivers & Vockell, 1987). 
General task descriptions within the simulation should be communicated to 
the learner and explicit understandings about what "counts" as a scientific 
explanation for phenomena should be discussed at some point in instruction 
(this is not the same as accepting a single answer). Constructivist learning 
environments do not require the learner to arrive at a predetermined answer, 
but rather allow the student form his/her own internal representations of 
phenomena. 
Students who have shallow motivations for academic work (completing tasks 
for the purpose of receiving a grade or besting others) are often frustrated with 
constructivist learning environments because there is not a "correct" answer; 
specific task requirements are not furnished for them (Miller & Hamilton, 1992), 
and there is difficulty quantitatively comparing understanding among students. 
Students who have more sophisticated motivations to understand the material 
profit from the constructivist approach, but being brought up within the 
industrialized model of American education, they "grow accustomed to the 
chains that bind them" and are also frustrated by the relatively unstructured 
nature of constructivist learning environments. 
Anomalies, part of the conceptual ecology, are important in simulation 
exercises. Incongruities that are recognized between an individual's 
explanations and the way phenomena actually occur in different environments 
are often vague and ill-defined in the mind of the learner. When learners 
realize, within the environment of the computer simulation, that they are 
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creating explanations "ad hoc" for most situations, or that incompleteness exists 
in explanations, their conceptual shortcomings are made explicit. The power to 
set conditions and test them repeatedly can produce successive iterations of 
inconsistency in predicted results that parallel the activities of confrontational 
class discussion and the argument of refutational text. 
Although the prescriptive use of simulations can direct a student to set 
conditions within the simulation that exemplify a common misconception, it 
may not be the misconception of that particular learner, and may serve to 
confuse rather than guide. 
Using simulations as vehicles for conceptual change 
Simulations allow a student to observe a system of interrelationships, make 
changes in the system, hypothesize about the effects of these changes, then enact 
the system to see the results. In a computer model of photosynthesis there may 
be representations of plant parts, various gasses and light quality. If a learner 
observes how resources are used by the plant to make sugars and other products, 
curiosity may be aroused as to what would happen if some of these inputs were 
adjusted. Increasing the amount of a single variable quantity may not lead to 
expected results, and more problems are created than solved. This is not 
necessarily problematic in the constructivist view; part of the premise with well 
constructed learning environments is that there is not a single correct answer, 
and problem identification should be left to the student. The potential for 
simulations to help the student develop problem identification as well as 
problem solving skills is evident. There are many opportunities in some (but 
not all) simulations to identify and isolate variables, develop a structured 
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solution strategy, and monitor progress. One caveat here is that the learner's 
approach should have some structure whether it is self-imposed or teacher- * 
imposed. Simulation software has become very dynamic, the possibility for 
disorientation is greater when the learner's approach is haphazard. 
Another strength in the design of simulations is their potential to effect 
conceptual change. Zietsman and Hewson (1986) used a computer simulation to 
diagnose and remediate alternative conceptions about velocity. Their results 
showed that: 1) computer simulations are credible representations of reality, and 
2) remediation using simulations produced significant conceptual change in 
those students holding alternative conceptions. There are studies that have 
found little or no effect using simulations to effect conceptual change. In an 
study on electrical circuits, Carlsen and Andre (1992) found that using text 
designed for conceptual change resulted a significant alteration of 
misconceptions, but that using a computer simulation in addition to the text 
produced no greater change than text alone. 
Gorsky and Finegold (1992) assert that if naive conceptions are grounded in 
personal experience, then re-experience of the phenomena in an educational 
environment may be effective in precipitating conceptual change. Other than 
laboratory experiences for the students, this implies the use of simulations. 
Using Strike and Posner's model of conceptual change, the issues of 
dissatisfaction with a current conception, and the intelligibility, plausibility, and 
fruitfulness of the scientific conception can all be addressed in a learning 
environment supported by simulations. Dissatisfaction arises when, within the 
simulation's domain, the user is faced with results that conflict with what was 
predicted. An addition of carbon dioxide to a plant's immediate environment 
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does not always result in a greater production of sugars and oxygen. Simulations 
that display phenomena with multiple representations (below the level of 
distraction) give the user perceptual choices. These choices help make the 
system's relationships more intelligible, and the intelligibility of the system as a 
whole gives a clearer picture of phenomenological relations. Use of simulations 
prior to didactic instruction may help establish the intelligibility of scientific 
concepts (Gorsky & Finegold, 1992). When used to provide an introductory 
framework prior to formal classroom instruction, simulations have facilitated 
learning gains in the areas of knowledge (Thomas & Hooper, 1991) and 
application of knowledge (Brant, Hooper, & Sugrue, 1991). Plausibility of a new 
conception is dependent on intelligibility. In a simulation, candidate hypotheses 
are quickly tested, and the fruitfulness of the results give retrospective 
plausibility to the candidate hypotheses. If a user sets up conditions within a 
simulation that result in a confirmation of predictions and the student can 
understand what they have done to the system (not always a given), there is a 
chance that the student can refine their conceptual understanding of a 
phenomenon. 
The above argument assumes several things. One is that the student 
comprehends the nature of the simulated environment and knows how to 
create, test, and interpret hypothetical situations. Trial and error in a simulation 
is not uncommon, and results for students who use this approach may be 
uninterpretable. 
Another assumption (not particular to simulations) is that the conceptual 
change process is entirely rational. When user-determined conditions in a 
simulation environment provide results, they can be rejected on any number of 
non-rational grounds. Gorsky and Finegold (1992) used a dissonance-based 
strategy with the use of a physics simulation to achieve conceptual change. 
Dissonance, the learner's comprehension that what they expected is not what is 
taking place, can create dissatisfaction with an phenomenal explanation. West 
and Pines (1983) assert that a discrepant event may fail to initiate a conceptual 
change process if anomalies are seen as irrelevant, inappropriate, or useless. 
There are a variety of ways a student may react to an anomaly; Gorsky and 
Finegold have outlined five possible reactions. Students may: 
• not perceive the anomaly, 
• perceive the anomaly but not understand it, 
• understand the anomaly but not accept it, 
• accept the anomaly, but fail to reject their incorrect views, or 
• reject their incorrect views and accept the scientific ones. 
Other researchers suggest that students tend to assimilate conflicting information 
into a widening web of misconceptions rather than go through the process of 
accommodation, and that in the absence of some direct instruction, students use 
their own misconceptions to explain phenomena (Perkins & Simmons, 1988; 
Anderson & Smith, 1987). Other than manipulating direct personal experience, 
perhaps the most efficient way to present anomalies to students is by simulated 
experiences; the particular ways that students react to these anomalies is a topic 
for further study. 
Students often believe that phenomena behaves one way in the classroom, 
and another in the real world. Some students regard computer representations 
as fantasy, and as such have difficulty in making conceptual connections to real 
phenomena around them. Some simulations are designed to show 
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counterfactual representations of phenomena that purposely violate natural 
laws. These "alternative realities" are designed to invoke dissatisfaction with 
learner explanations of how processes take place, but we know very little about 
user's perceived relation between the simulation and the actual physical 
phenomena they represent. Research by Hennessy and O'Shea (1993 p. 129) 
describes the tendency for some secondary school students to "explain away 
conflict arising between their informal theories and their observations of 
simulated events by attributing magic properties to the computer or deviousness 
to the programmer." 
Yet another assumption is that the students are given the latitude to explore 
within the simulation. There are simulations that can be customized by the 
instructor to ensure certain types of interactions between the learner and the 
software. Some simulations are reduced to interactive tutorials by instructional 
directives. Objectivist instructors may set up simulation software for students 
that has a predetermined set of conditions and a prescribed set of instructions 
that force the students along a single path of non-choices. These conditions are 
excessive in their control and the scope of how learning can evolve is switched 
from individualistic to teacher-driven. A determination should be made on the 
continuum of objectivism-constructivism as to where students receive 
maximum benefit from this type of instructional technology, and how this 
technology fits into the larger view of instruction. 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample evidence that computer simulations can contribute to the 
conceptualization of phenomena and relationships. There is also evidence that 
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the process of conceptual change can be facilitated by the implementation of 
simulations in the learning environment. The idea that simulations or any-
other computer-related technology can serve as a stand-alone instructional 
method is unsupported. The review of literature shows that a simulation's 
efficacy in enhancing conceptual change is dependent upon: 
• the simulation's support of conceptual change conditions that have 
been effective with other media (seeking out misconceptions, making 
misconceptions explicit, offering refutational evidence to the learner), 
• the timing of the simulation's use with respect to other supporting 
instructional methods, 
• the type of phenomena being simulated, 
• the particular characteristics of misconception being addressed, 
• the characteristics of the learner with respect to that particular 
misconception, and 
• the general characteristics of the learner. 
There are several challenges to researchers in the area of constructivist uses of 
simulations to promote conceptual change. One is that constructivist 
instructional theory offers an approach to learning that involves many 
variations from traditional instruction. Some of these variations are: the nature 
of the tasks given to students, the time frame students are given to work on 
projects, the complexity of the tasks, the multiplicity of resources and 
perspectives offered to students, the context-supported learning environment, 
and the way assessment is embedded into constructivist learning activities. 
Efforts to isolate and use single variables of a constructivist learning 
environment for empirical comparison with a type of "control" group destroys 
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the systemic nature of constructivist processes. This relates to another challenge 
related to constructivist uses of technology, that of measuring learning in the 
student. 
Traditional fixed answer assessments may account for only 10% of variance in 
total functional knowledge in a student (Novak, 1987). Even complex, authentic 
product measures do not provide enough information about how learning 
occurs in certain situations. Process measures rather than product measures may 
offer the best insight into the conceptualizing process of students. Cognitive 
interviews, teach-back, and think-aloud protocols are time consuming and 
vulnerable to criticism from strict empiricists, but they offer potential for 
understanding the processes behind the persistence of misconceptualizations. 
Computer simulations offer an ongoing activity that is amenable to the process 
measures described. Think-aloud sessions which record a learner's continuous 
hypothesis testing and personal reflections while using simulations may give 
insight into conceptualization processes that product measures fail to reveal. 
Developing more refined typologies for: simulations, uses of simulations 
within the larger learning environment, conceptions, and alternative 
conceptions will help clarify the discourse in the area of conceptual change 
strategies. These challenges to discovering the full potential of simulations for 
enhancing conceptual change serve to create exciting alternatives to the 
traditional methods of instruction. 
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2. USING COMPUTER SIMULATIONS TO ENHANCE CONCEPTUAL 
CHANGE: THE ROLES OF CONSTRUCTIVIST 
INSTRUCTION AND STUDENT EPISTEMOLOGICAL BELIEFS 
A paper to be submitted to the Journal of Computer-Based Instruction 
Mark A. Windschitl 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Alternative conceptions in science education 
Overview 
Students' informal ideas about natural phenomena often influence their 
ability to learn science. These conceptions have been described in areas such as 
the human cardiovascular system (Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1986), electric circuits 
(Dupin & Johsua, 1987), the reflection of light (Mohapatra, 1988), and simple 
mechanics (Viennot & Rozier, 1994). Such informal ideas, also known as 
alternative conceptions, have the general characteristics of being poorly 
articulated, internally inconsistent, and highly dependent on context. Despite 
these qualities, informal ideas often have tremendous explanatory power in the 
mind of the student (Driver & Easley, 1978; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982; Pines, 1985). In some cases, this explanatory 
power makes such informal ideas highly resistant to change. 
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Terminology of alternative conceptions 
Scientific explanations, with their characteristic rationality and 
generalizability are considered "correct" by content experts and are often at odds 
with the informal explanations of phenomena held by young learners; this gives 
rise to the term "alternative conception" for the learner's explanation 
(alternative to the scientific conception). Other terms used to describe these non-
scientific conceptions are: alternative frameworks (Driver & Easley, 1978), naive 
conceptions (Champagne, Gunstone, & Klopfer, 1983), children's science (Gilbert, 
Osborne, & Fensham, 1982) and misconceptions. 
Claims concerning alternative conceptions 
Wandersee, Mintzes, and Novak (1994) have summarized the research 
evidence on alternative conceptions. They suggest that: 
• learners have a diverse set of alternative conceptions with regard to 
objects and phenomena, 
• alternative conceptions exist across age and ability, and 
• success in leading learners to revise alternative conceptions is highly 
dependent upon instructional methods and the nature of the 
alternative conception. 
The most resistant alternative conceptions are those in the physical sciences 
that are counterintuitive, such as forces being exerted by stationary objects 
(Gorsky & Finegold, 1992). 
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Concepts regarding the human cardiovascular system 
Student ideas concerning the cardiovascular system typify the scope of 
alternative conceptions in a curricular area. Mintzes, Trowbridge, Arnaudin, 
and Wandersee (1991) questioned students in 5th, 8th, and 10th grade, as well as 
college freshmen/sophomores about the cardiovascular system. When asked to 
select from several illustrations which heart was most like their own, three- and 
four-chambered hearts were chosen in equal numbers by the middle school and 
high school students, while college students selected the four-chambered heart in 
a 2:1 ratio over the three-chambered. Few students among those who chose the 
four-chambered heart as a model could explain the function of the chambers. 
This finding supports the assumption that anatomical knowledge has limited 
connection with a broader functional conceptualization of how the circulatory 
system works. 
At every grade level, most students (65-80%) understood that the heart pumps 
blood, but as many as a third at each level suggested that the heart also cleans, 
makes, filters, and stores blood. Excepting college biology majors, fewer than a 
third of those questioned understood that the right side of the heart pumps 
deoxygenated blood, and many students failed to acknowledge in any respect that 
the heart acts as a double pump. 
When asked to select an illustration that describes the path of blood in the 
body, the students' most frequent response was an incorrect pattern in which 
blood flowed from the heart to an extremity then back to the heart, not including 
any flow to the lungs. There was a trend towards selecting the correct circulatory 
pattern (including systemic and pulmonary circulation) with increasing age. 
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Identifying alternative conceptions common to a particular subject area 
facilitates a logical next step— attempting to determine the conditions under 
which learners revise these alternative conceptions. 
Conceptual change 
Conditions for conceptual change 
There is no well articulated theory that describes the substantive changes in 
the process by which individuals' central, organizing conceptual frameworks are 
replaced by another set of beliefs which are incompatible with the first (Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982). It is commonly held that learning is the 
interaction between what a person is taught, and what he/she already possesses 
as conceptual structures. 
Conditions that promote conceptual change have been described as follows 
(Posner et al., 1982; Hewson, 1981; Hewson & Hewson, 1983; Hewson & Thorley, 
1989): 
1) There must be dissatisfaction with an existing conception. This can 
occur when a conception cannot be reconciled with new experiences (anomaly) 
or when the conception violates some epistemological criteria. Without a 
sufficient level of dissatisfaction, students tend to assimilate conflicting 
information into a widening web of misconceptions rather than go through the 
process of conceptual change, and that in the absence of some direct instruction, 
students use their own misconceptions to explain phenomena (Perkins & 
Simmons, 1988; Anderson & Smith, 1987). 
2) The new conception must be intelligible. If this condition is not met, 
the learner has no option but to internalize the conception through rote 
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memorization, which means there are no propositional linkages formed, and 
reconciliation with existing schema does not occur. 
3) The new conception must be plausible. This presupposes that the new 
model is intelligible, but intelligibility is not sufficient. The new conception 
must also be congruent with personal standards of knowledge. Specious 
conditions of plausibility are generated when the classroom learning 
environment emphasizes authoritarian epistemology. Students may be 
socialized to believe that the "teacher is always right" or authors are infallible, 
thus, ideas directly transmitted from those sources may carry a predetermined 
level of plausibility. 
4) The new conception must he fruitful. The candidate conception should 
have the power to solve problems or predict phenomena more decisively than 
the conception it will replace. 
Strike and Posner's original theory has been criticized for failing to consider 
the forces of motivational beliefs of the learner such as goals, purposes, and 
intentions. The assumption is that school children seek to resolve discrepancies 
between their conceptions and natural phenomena as a primary goal of 
intellectual activity. In reality, children often resolve their misconceptions with 
the goal of receiving a good grade (this goal is not always congruent with gaining 
a scientific set of conceptions), preserving self-esteem in an intellectually 
overwhelming situation, or bringing closure to a learning situation at any cost 
(Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993). 
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Epistemological beliefs and conceptual change 
Some authors have elaborated on the possibility that motivational beliefs 
(goals, values, self-efficacy, and control beliefs) play a major role in conceptual 
change (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; West & Pines, 1983; Dweck, 1986; 
Entwistle, Entwistle, & Tait, 1993). Students have many social goals such as 
making friends, besting others, or impressing the teacher. These goals, not 
directly associated with learning, result in surface processing and less intellectual 
engagement. This surface processing is reinforced by traditional forms of 
education which emphasize the acquisition of incremental, decontextualized 
knowledge (Entwistle, Entwistle, & Tait, 1993). 
Epistemic motivation has been defined as one's beliefs toward knowledge and 
the process of building knowledge (Boyle, Magnusson, & Young, 1993). 
Kruglanski (1989, 1990) suggested that a learner's motivation toward knowledge 
as an object (epistemic motivation) influences knowledge acquisition. 
In research with post secondary students' beliefs about the nature of 
knowledge and learning, Schommer (1993a) described students' epistemological 
dispositions that have implications for how students view learning, and how 
they choose to deal with new knowledge. She identified four dimensions of 
belief. The four continua are belief in: 
1) simple knowledge~> complex knowledge, 
2) quick knowledge—> knowledge being gained over time, 
3) certain knowledge (strong duality of right versus wrong) ~> 
knowledge as context-dependent, and 
4) deterministic innate ability~> ability to "learn how to learn." 
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She found that junior college students tended to believe in simple, certain, 
and quick knowledge when compared with university students, and that 
technological science majors tended to believe in quick learning when compared 
with non-technological science majors. A later study with 1,000 high school 
students (Schommer, 1993b) showed that belief in simple, certain, and quick 
knowledge decreased from freshman to senior year. Additionally there were 
many learners who were sophisticated in some aspects of epistemological belief 
but not in others. 
Dweck (1986) suggests that children who believe intelligence is a fixed trait 
tend to focus their efforts toward gaining favorable judgments of that trait 
(performance goals) and shy away from challenging academic situations. 
Children who believe intelligence can be cultivated orient themselves toward 
developing that quality (learning goals) and seek challenging intellectual 
situations as well as deeper understandings. 
Strategies for promoting conceptual change 
In a general sense, some conceptual change strategies focus on externalizing 
(exposing) the learner's knowledge structure, then modifying it (Lawson & 
Weser, 1990; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992). Other strategies emphasize the need for 
self-monitoring and controlling the events of learning. Anderson and Smith 
(1987) list three features of successful conceptual change instruction: presenting 
direct refutation to student misconceptions, immediate application of scientific 
conception to explanation of phenomena, and explicit emphasis with repetition. 
In a metanalysis of conceptual change strategies, Guzzetti, Snyder, Glass, and 
Gamas (1993) summarize the effective conceptual change methods as all 
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producing some form of cognitive conflict. Teaching practices that challenge 
existing understandings, cause students to face contradictions and recognize 
counterexamples all appear to facilitate conceptual change. 
These conceptual conflict strategies are strongly associated w^ith 
constructivism; they are premised on the idea that learning is a complex process 
in which the learner's conceptions interact with new information. This study 
investigated the relationship between conceptual change and the use of 
constructivist versus non-constructivist computer simulation exercises. 
The use of computer simulations in instruction 
Overview 
The increasing availability of computer-related technologies in classrooms 
(Becker, 1991) has prompted the investigation of their influence on learning and 
achievement, including the processes of conceptual development and conceptual 
change. Among types of computer applications, simulations seem to offer strong 
potential as agents contributing to conceptual change. The ability of simulations 
to portray phenomena and to allow users to interact with the dynamics of a 
model system create an arguably unique way of helping learners conceptualize. 
Educators use models as tools for helping students understand a process or 
thing. A model acts as a metaphor for the student to access something that is less 
well known by comparing it to something that is more familiar (Snir, Smith, & 
Grosslight, 1988). A simulation is a dynamic execution of the processes within a 
relational model system. One instructional advantage of a computer-based 
simulation is the ability to make normally unobservable occurrences plainly 
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visible for the student. Additionally, real systems are often filled with non-
relevant information, adding a distracting element to the cognitive load of 
understanding the concept. Computer-based simulations can eliminate (within 
limits) extraneous information and employ perceptual cues (also referred to as 
process highlighters) that draw the learner's attention to critical features and 
events that are functionally invisible (Chandler & Chaill^ 1993). 
As with many computer based learning tools, much of the early research on 
simulations focused on their instructional effectiveness compared with non-
computer-based media. Currently, more sophisticated research is being 
conducted on the uses of simulations with respect to other instructional 
elements (didactic instruction, collaboration, lab experiences, assessment). 
Constructivist uses of technology 
There are two distinct but complementary constructivist perspectives 
concerning knowledge construction (Cobb, 1994). The cognitive constructivist 
view emphasizes the unique way knowledge is configured and influenced 
within the individual learner. The sociocultural cognitive view emphasizes the 
development of shared knowledge through social interaction. This study uses 
the cognitive constructivist paradigm as its basis for investigation. 
As learners try to systematize their understanding of phenomenological 
relationships, they may profit from judicious didactic instruction (Klausmeier, 
1961), but the complex picture of the conceptualization processes that is emerging 
from research indicates that learners create their own idiosyncratic webs of 
knowledge that are highly dependent on their backgrounds. Learners are adept 
at different symbol systems such as language-based, logico-mathematical, or 
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iconic (Gardner, 1993 & 1994); they have different learning styles and can have 
vastly different motivations for doing tasks (Pintrich et al., 1993; Schommer, 
1993a & 1993b). The variety of learner characteristics described here supports the 
rationale for a constructivist view of learning, but they also contribute to the 
design of constructivist instructional theory. 
Constructivist learning environments do not require the learner to arrive at a 
predetermined answer, but rather allow students to form his/her own internal 
representations of phenomena. A constructivist application of a well-designed 
simulation allows learners to choose their mode of informational representation 
on the computer screen; it allows them to develop hypotheses about phenomena 
that are accommodative of their way of solving problems. This is not to say that 
there is no place for the prescriptive in instruction. Unguided inquiry, especially 
using computer simulations can be an exercise in futility for the student (Rivers 
& Vockell, 1987). 
Constructivist learning environments may frustrate students who have 
shallow motivations for academic work (completing tasks for the purpose of 
receiving a grade or besting others) because there is not a "correct" answer. 
Specific task requirements are not furnished for them (Miller & Hamilton, 1992) 
and there is difficulty quantitatively comparing understanding among students. 
Students who have more sophisticated motivations to understand the material 
profit from the constructivist approach, but may also be frustrated by the 
relatively unstructured nature of constructivist learning environments. 
57 
Using simulations as vehicles for conceptual change 
Gorsky and Finegold (1992) assert that if naive conceptions are grounded in 
personal experience, then re-experience of the phenomena in an educational 
environment may be effective in precipitating conceptual change. Other than 
laboratory experiences for the students, this implies the use of simulations. 
Zietsman and Hewson (1986) used a computer simulation to diagnose and 
remediate alternative conceptions about velocity. Their results showed that: 
1) computer simulations can be credible representations of reality, and 
2) remediation produced significant conceptual change in those students 
holding alternative conceptions. 
There are studies that have found little or no effect using simulations to 
promote conceptual change. In an study on electrical circuits, Carlsen and Andre 
(1992) found that using text designed for conceptual change resulted a significant 
alteration of misconceptions, but that using a computer simulation in addition 
to the text produced no greater change than the text alone. 
Using Strike and Posner's model of conceptual change, the issues of 
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dissatisfaction with a current conception, and the intelligibility, plausibility, and 
fruitfulness of the scientific conception can all be addressed in a learning 
environment supported by the constructivist use of simulations. Dissatisfaction 
arises when, within the simulation's domain, the user is faced with results that 
conflict with what the learner predicted. Asking students to make and explain 
predictions can activate prior knowledge and force them to mindfully articulate 
explanations. Prediction and testing encourages "internal discourse" to take 
place in the mind of the student (Perkins & Simmons, 1988); only by stimulating 
hypothesis-testing on the part of the learner can computer-based instruction offer 
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the possibility of conceptual conflict (Osborne & Squires, 1987). Also, the power 
to set conditions and test them repeatedly can produce successive iterations of 
inconsistency between predicted and actual results that parallel the activities of 
confrontational class discussion and the argument of refutational text. 
Dissonance-based conceptual change strategies have been used with mixed 
results in the area of physics simulations (Gorsky & Finegold, 1992). 
Objectivist approaches to instruction (antithetical to constructivism) treat 
knowledge as directly transmissible to the learner from various sources. 
Objectivist uses of simulations often become "cookbook" exercises that reflect the 
simplistic confirmatory nature of many science lab exercises. This may 
effectively promote complacency toward a critical examination of simulated 
phenomena and fail to activate prior knowledge. 
Intelligibility, a second criteria for conceptual change, may be established by 
use of simulations prior to didactic instruction (Gorsky & Finegold, 1992). When 
used to provide an introductory framework to formal classroom instruction, 
simulations have facilitated learning gains in the areas of knowledge (Thomas & 
Hooper, 1991) and application of knowledge (Brant, Hooper, & Sugrue, 1991). 
Also, simulations that display phenomena with multiple representation types 
(below the level of distraction) give the user perceptual choices. These choices 
can help make the system's relationships more intelligible and the intelligibility 
of the system as a whole gives a clearer picture of phenomenological relations. 
Confirmatory (objectivist) simulation exercises do not necessarily engage the 
learner beyond following instructions, and the process of sense-making (a strong 
epistemological preference in many students) is not part of the cognitive activity. 
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Using a strong theme or storyline with simulations capitalizes on the 
constructivist idea of contextually-bound knowledge. It adds coherence and level 
of intelligibility beyond the level of "information" (Cognition & Technology 
Group at Vanderbilt, 1990). 
The plausibility of a new conception is dependent on intelligibility. In a 
simulation, candidate hypotheses are quickly tested, and the fruitfulness of the 
hypotheses (in explaining or predicting results) give retrospective plausibility to 
the candidate hypotheses. If a learner sets up conditions within a simulation 
that result in a confirmation of predictions, and the learner can understand what 
they have done to the system (not always a given), there is a chance that they can 
refine their conceptual understanding of a phenomena. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Constructivist uses of simulations appear to produce conditions cited by 
literature that facilitate conceptual change. In this study, one treatment group 
(the exploratory group) was placed in a constructivist instructional setting. This 
group, used a computer-based cardiovascular simulation exercise in a context-
bound framework and was allowed to create and test hypotheses regarding 
cardiovascular phenomena (see the Procedures section). The other treatment 
group (the confirmatory group) completed the same simulation exercise, but in a 
prescribed fashion to simply confirm information as directed by a written guide 
(see the Procedures section). 
Hypothesis 1: When prior computer experience and pretest scores are 
statistically controlled, the exploratory simulation group will demonstrate a 
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significantly greater degree of conceptual change as compared with the 
confirmatory simulation group. 
Student epistemological beliefs may have an influence on the depth of 
information processing and potential for conceptual change. Furthermore, the 
constructivist use of simulations may favor the subjects with a higher degree of 
epistemological sophistication, differentially encouraging them toward deeper 
information processing and conceptual change. 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of epistemological sophistication will more 
positively co-vary with posttest scores in the exploratory simulation group than 
in the confirmatory simulation group. Thus, it is hypothesized that degree of 
epistemological sophistication and simulation condition will interact. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
The sample was composed of approximately 250 students who were non-
biology majors at a large midwestern university. This subject group was 
composed mostly of freshman and sophomores who typically have taken no 
other life science courses at the university. These students were enrolled in a 
human anatomy and physiology survey course in the spring semester of 1995. 
This course introduced students to the anatomy of the human body as well as the 
physiology of the cardiovascular, nervous, digestive, muscular, and skeletal 
systems. 
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Design 
Students participated in their assigned class sections; there were 14 sections of 
approximately 15 students each. Each of the 14 sections was randomly assigned 
to one of two conditions: 
1) In the confirmatory simulation condition, students used the 
cardiovascular simulation in prescribed steps, following written instructions that 
lead to the resolution of a set of 12 questions. 
2) In the exploratory simulation condition, the same cardiovascular 
simulation was used in a constructivist setting. Students used a thematic 
instructional guide to hypothesize about and test possible answers to the same 12 
questions used by the confirmatory group. 
The nature of the differences between the two groups is illustrated in the 
description of the materials below. 
Materials 
All procedures and materials were tested earlier in the semester in a pilot 
study. Two groups of 25 students enrolled in a Physical Education class at the 
same university were used as subjects for the pilot study. As a result of the pilot, 
pre- and posttest questions were refined. In addition, the theme of a hypothetical 
student's experiences was incorporated into the exploratory group's guide text. 
Computer simulation 
A computer simulation that modeled the functioning of the human 
cardiovascular system was used for this study. The simulation presented the 
user with two "windows", one of which contained buttons that could be selected 
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Figure 1. Sample of simulation screen containing 
graphical display of physiological data (used with 
permission by LogaF^ software). 
to display dynamic information in multiple forms such as line graphs, bar 
graphs, pie graphs, digital counters (see Fig. 1). 
This information was reflective of the pictorial representations in the second 
window. The second window (see Fig. 2) contained an electrocardiograph-type 
display, a transparent frontal view of the human circulatory system, a 
transparent frontal view of the heart, and a small animated figure that could be 
made to rest, walk, or run by the user. Additionally, the user could select a 
fitness level for the simulated figure. 
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Figure 2. Sample of simulation screen containing 
animated pictorial displays of physiological phenomena 
(used with permission by LogaF" software). 
Written simulation guides 
The manner in which the computer simulation was used was one 
independent variable. Alternative conceptions that students typically hold about 
the human cardiovascular system were identified in a pilot study. These 
alternative conception topics were incorporated into the written simulation 
guide. The guide for the confirmatory group provided carefully prescribed 
written steps to follow. These steps guided the user through the simulation 
without latitude in making decisions about creating or testing hypotheses within 
the simulation. This guide turned the exercise into a "cookbook" procedure 
(Figure 3 illustrates a confirmatory case). 
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The written guide for the exploratory group was based on a set of cases 
concerning a hypothetical individual. The contrast in the two guides is shown 
in Figure 3, and explained further in the Procedures section. 
(Confirmatory) Case #7: At rest, are there any significant differences between an 
fit and unfit individual concerning heart rate and/or stroke volume? 
Stay on the STROKE VOLUME window. Change the figure to a "couch potato" 
and standing still; now click the GO icon; wait until the readings stabilize then 
record the stroke volume and heart rate here: 
Change the figure to an athlete and standing still, now click the GO icon ,wait 
until the readings stabilize then record the stroke volume and heart rate here: 
(Exploratory) Case #7: Lyrm is disappointed in the results of the treadmill test 
and plans to begin exercising regularly. Lyrm asks the doctor if a person who 
becomes an athlete will see a change in heart rate or stroke volume when at rest. 
At rest, are there any significant differences between an fit and unfit individual 
concerning heart rate and/or stroke volume? 
Write your prediction here and explain briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simulation. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case with the simulation, include specific 
numbers. State a conclusion. 
Figure 3. Confirmatory and exploratory sample cases. 
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Epistemological survey 
The students' epistemological beliefs comprised one set of independent 
variables and were determined by a previously tested instrument developed by 
Schommer (1993a). The 63-item instrument consists of 12 logical subsets. The 
overall mean of the subset means was used as the independent variable. 
Examples of some of the logical subsets are (from the naive viewpoint): belief in 
learning information the first time you are exposed to it, belief that learning is an 
innate ability, and belief in single answers to problems. A typical item (rated on a 
five point agree-disagree Likert-type scale) is "The most successful people have 
discovered how to improve their ability to learn." 
Multiple choice pretest of cardiovascular concepts 
The pretest was a 24-item multiple choice instrument with questions designed 
by a human physiology instructor, the author, and two instructors in health and 
human performance. The questions focused on common misconceptions from 
relevant literature and misconceptions noted from the experience of the 
instructors. Six areas of conceptualization were identified: the effects of activity 
on blood flow, pattern of blood flow through circulatory system, blood flow to 
the brain, movement of oxygen through lungs and heart, structure of the heart, 
and blood flow within the heart. The pretest solicited information on gender, 
frequency of computer use, and perceived proficiency with computers. 
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Concept comparison posttest 
One posttest measure was a concept pairing test in which students were asked 
to rate the closeness of the relationship between pairs of terms (22 pair total). 
Studies have shown that this method can validly assess an individual's 
conceptual and structural knowledge (Stanners, Brown, Price, & Holmes, 1983; 
Diekoff, 1983). The terms for this instrument were suggested by experts in the 
area of the human cardiovascular system. These terms (or phrases) were paired 
with each other, with some pair intended to be perceived as having a high degree 
of association such as "heart rate" and "activity", and other pair intended to be 
perceived as having a lower degree of association such as "capillary" and "cardiac 
output." Another set of seven experts rated the closeness of the pairs of terms on 
a one to five scale. After calculating the z-scores across and within expert raters, 
ten pair of terms with the highest variance across expert raters were deleted from 
the original criterion group. The average expert rating of each remaining pair 
were used as the criterion against which student scores were compared. 
The concept pairs were: 
ventricle stroke volume 
carbon dioxide arteries 
artery high blood pressure 
heart lungs 
stroke volume high fitness 
physical activity heart rate 
vessel diameter blood pressure 
low fitness arteries 
atrium ventricle 
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blood vessel 
lungs 
heart rate 
vein 
blood flow 
oxygen 
blood pressure 
blood pressure 
exercise 
blood flow 
cardiac output 
capillary 
ventricle 
cardiac output 
heart 
blood pressure 
vessel diameter 
artery 
vessel diameter 
capillaries 
stroke volume 
adrenaline 
vessel diameter 
activity 
heart rate 
vein 
heart 
capillary. 
Multiple choice posttest 
Another posttest instrument was a multiple choice instrument parallel to the 
pretest instrument, using approximately the same number of questions. An 
example of a posttest question is: 
In the atria of the heart, would you find blood that is relatively high in oxygen or 
low in oxygen? 
a. low d. a mixture of high and low 
b. high e. blood does not enter the atria 
c. high or low, depending on 
which atrium 
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Procedures 
The study took place in regular laboratory sessions of the class. In Week 1, all 
subjects were briefly shown the cardiovascular simulation in their laboratory 
class. This was done to acquaint all subjects with the functions of the simulation 
so that they would be able to spend more time "using" the simulation rather 
than learning "how to use" it during the next two lab periods. All subjects also 
completed the epistemological survey and the multiple choice pretest on 
conceptual understanding of various aspects of the human cardiovascular 
system. 
In Week 2, students met during regular class times in a nearby computer lab. 
The subjects were introduced to the simulation and given an instructional guide 
which included identical introductory information for both groups, but different 
"case" descriptions for each group to follow. With the subjects seated 
individually at computer stations, they were shown what the dynamic graphical 
outputs represented, and how to select various views. They were also shown 
how to change the effort and fitness levels of the simulated character. Beyond 
this stage, the two subject groups were given a slightly different orientation to 
the simulation. 
The confirmatory group was asked to follow verbal directions to set certain 
variables within the simulation and generate the screen conditions to show a 
particular type of output for interpretation. This was to be done in a step-by step, 
prescribed fashion. The confirmatory group was then given a set of specific 
instructions to follow in manipulating the software. These instructions led 
them to deal with concepts that had been identified as sources of misconceptions 
for students at this level. The students had few options for exploration; they 
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were prompted to select appropriate parameters to adjust and to select particular 
graphical outputs for display in order to be presented with evidence that refuted 
commonly held misconceptions about aspects of the cardiovascular system. 
Over the next two laboratory class periods, the students attempted to resolve 12 
"cases" that were designed to generate refutational evidence about several 
commonly held misconceptions. 
The exploratory groups were prompted during the orientation period to 
consider how to construct simple hypotheses about the cardiovascular system's 
operation. They were shown how to test a sample hypothesis using the 
simulation. They were then asked to participate in testing another sample 
hypothesis using their own computers, and the results were discussed. They 
were then given a general set of guidelines to follow in exploring their 
conceptions of the cardiovascular system. They were asked to resolve the same 
12 cases that the confirmatory group investigated, but without being given 
further specific direction. These 12 cases were components of a larger theme 
dealing with a hypothetical college student whose ongoing health situations 
furnished the exploratory group with the same basic cases as the confirmatory 
group (Fig. 3). Individuals in the exploratory group were required to state 
explicitly a prediction about certain phenomena within cases, formulate their 
own hypotheses about how to test their prediction with the simulation, and then 
find ways to test them. 
For the exploratory group, any interaction with the researcher or teaching 
assistants was limited to solving software difficulties or suggesting how to 
formulate hypotheses without reference to specific cases they were working on. 
These interactions were minimal. 
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In Week 3, both groups had 45 minutes to continue their experience with the 
simulation. Due to the constraints of the natural class setting, some students 
finished ahead of others. Because the posttests were administered immediately 
after the last individuals completed their cases, some individuals finishing later 
may not have had an opportunity to reflect upon their answers to the last case. 
For this reason, only information from the first 10 of the 12 cases were assessed 
in the posttests. The posttest was a multiple choice test, parallel to the pretest 
multiple choice, and a concept comparison test. These were given at the end of 
the class period. 
There was a recitation class held weekly that was associated with the 
laboratory. Six of the fourteen recitation sections were taught by the head lab 
coordinator and the other eight were taught by a novice instructor. Recitation 
instructor then, was used as a covariate in later statistical analyses. 
RESULTS 
Reliabilities 
The pretest internal consistency estimate was .52 (using Cronbach's alpha); 
this low estimate may have been due to random guessing by the subjects and to 
the diversity of topical areas addressed by the test. The internal consistency of the 
epistemological survey (using the means of each of the 12 subscales as items) was 
.69. The alpha values for the posttest multiple choice and posttest concept 
comparison instruments were .77 and .64 respectively (Table 1). The correlation 
between the pre- and posttest multiple choice tests was .60. 
71 
Pretest 
The pretest (multiple choice, covering cardiovascular concepts) served as a 
covariate for analysis of posttest measures and helped identify areas of 
alternative conception. The mean score for all subjects was 15.72 (24 was the 
maximum possible, SD= 3.12). Table 2 presents means on responses to two 
questions about computer use. On a question about frequency of computer use, 
the choices ranged from "usually once a day" (value= 1) to "never" (value= 5); 
the mean was 3.42 (SD= 1.1, Table 2). In response to the question "As a student, 
how would you rate your general proficiency in using a computer?" most 
students rated themselves as "average" (132 of 221 students). The choices ranged 
from "very high" (value= 1) to "very low" (value= 5); the mean was 2.94 (SD= 
.74, Table 2). A composite of these two responses was used as a covariate termed 
"computer proficiency" in later analyses (alpha= .62) 
Identifying misconceptions 
The pretest was used to identify areas of misconception as well as act as a 
covariate for later analyses. When asked to select a diagram (adapted from 
Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1986) that depicted the pathway of blood in the body, 8% of 
respondents indicated blood traveling to an extremity such as the toe and 
remaining there (heart-toe). About 15% of respondents selected a path going 
from the toe to the lungs, then to the heart (heart-toe-lung-heart), about 30% of 
respondents selected a path going to the lungs, then to the toe, then the heart 
(heart-lung-toe-heart). The correct choice (double circulation) was selected by 
only 46% of the students (Table 3). 
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In response to the question "Going from rest to activity, what happens to the 
blood flow in the intestinal region?" 59% of students correctly selected "it 
decreases", 35% of students indicated that it increased. 
In response to the question "Going from rest to activity, what happens to the 
blood flow to the brain?" about 46% of students indicated that it would increase 
substantially. The correct response ("it remains about the same as during rest") 
was chosen by about 47% of students. 
Another question adapted from Arnaudin and Mintzes (1986) asked "Where 
does oxygen go after it enters your lungs?" About 5% of students indicated that 
"air tubes from the lungs carry oxygen throughout the body", about 6% indicated 
that "air tubes carry oxygen from the lungs through the heart", and 22% 
indicated that "blood in vessels carries oxygen directly to the body." The correct 
response, that blood in vessels carries oxygen from the lungs through the heart, 
was selected by 65% of respondents. 
Students were asked to select a correct diagram of the human heart. Only 52% 
correctly identified the four-chambered diagram. Other responses were one-
chambered (1%), two-chambered (12%), three-chambered (9%), and five-
chambered (26%). In a separate question asking directly about the number of 
chambers in the human heart (no diagrams) 89% of students indicated that the 
heart has four chambers. 
In response to the question "In the atria of the heart, would you find blood 
that is relatively high in oxygen or low in oxygen?" 38% of students chose the 
correct response (it depends on which atrium); the greatest response was "high in 
oxygen" (39%). 
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Correlations 
To determine possible relationships among demographic, pretest, posttest, and 
treatment variables, correlations were computed (Table 4). As expected, the 
pretest and multiple choice section of the posttest were significantly related (r= 
.60, p<.01). The concept comparison section of the posttest was significantly 
negatively correlated with the multiple choice section of the posttest (r= -.32, 
g.<.01). The concept comparison was a measure of each student's average 
deviation from an expert set of ratings. These ratings expressed the strength of 
relationships between pairs of cardiovascular concepts. Lower average deviation 
scores indicated greater understanding of relationships as expressed by experts in 
field. 
Scores on epistemological beliefs were negatively correlated with both pretest 
and posttest scores (r= -.29, ^ <.01 and r= -.19, p<.05 respectively). Since higher 
epistemological scores reflect a more naive point of view, greater levels of 
epistemological sophistication were associated with higher pre- and posttest 
scores. Epistemological belief was also significantly negatively correlated with 
computer proficiency (r= -.14, p<.05). Means and standard deviations for all 
measures mentioned above may be found in Table 5. 
Treatment group comparisons 
The first hypothesis predicted that the exploratory group would experience a 
greater degree of conceptual change than the confirmatory group when 
controlling for computer experience, pretest scores, gender, and recitation 
instructor. Areas of alternative conception were identified on the pretest by 
selecting questions that were answered incorrectly by a large number of students 
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(at least 70 out of 221). A further selection from this pool retained only those 
items that subjects were likely to have had prior conceptions about (through 
previous academic experience, media exposure, peer influence, or personal 
experience). There were some items that dealt with advanced concepts or 
terminology particular to a college physiology class that many subjects failed to 
answer correctly, but these were not used to identify alternative conceptions. 
This selection yielded six questions that focused on 
conceptions/misconceptions central to the structure and function of the 
cardiovascular system; some differences in posttest responses were found 
between the treatment groups (means presented in Table 6). 
Using only those students who held misconceptions about the internal 
structure of the human heart (as indicated by their answers on the pretest), a one­
way analysis of covariance with multiple covariates was computed using the 
score on a parallel posttest question as the dependent variable. With treatment 
group as the independent variable, and pretest, computer proficiency, gender, 
and recitation instructor as covariates, the exploratory group performed 
significantly better than the confirmatory group (F (1, 105)= 3.99, MSe= .23, p<.05, 
means presented inTable 6). 
Using those students who held misconceptions about where oxygen goes after 
it enters the lungs (as indicated by their answers on the pretest)^ a one-way 
analysis of covariance with multiple covariates was computed using treatment 
group as the independent variable. The score on a parallel posttest question was 
the dependent variable. Using pretest, computer proficiency, gender, and 
recitation instructor as covariates, the exploratory group performed significantly 
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better than the confirmatory group (F (1, 76)= 4.03, MSe= .23, ^<.05, means 
presented inTable 6). 
No significant group differences were found (using the one-way analysis of 
covariance described above) for those students who held misconceptions about 
the question "Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow in the 
intestinal region?" (F (1, 89)=2.31, MSe= .22, pL<-13, means presented inTable 6). 
No significant group differences were found for those students who held 
misconceptions about the path of blood in the circulatory system (F(l, 118)= .66, 
MSe= .25, p<.42, means presented inTable 6), about the flow of blood to the brain 
during activity (F (1,117)= .10, MSe= .25, p^<.76, means presented inTable 6), or 
about the oxygen content of blood in the atria of the heart (F (1, 136)= 1.14, MSe= 
.22, ^<.29, means presented inTable 6). 
A one-way analysis of covariance was computed on the posttest score totals, 
with treatment group as the independent variable, and pretest, computer 
proficiency, gender, and recitation instructor as covariates. For the multiple 
choice section of the posttest there was no significant difference between the 
groups (F (1, 216)=.05, MSe= 11.70, p<.83, means presented in Table 5). There 
were no significant differences between the treatment groups concerning the 
concept comparison measures (F (1, 216)=.20, MSe= .23, p<.65, means presented 
in Table 5). 
Regression on posttests 
The second hypothesis predicted that the degree of epistemological 
sophistication would more positively co-vary with posttest scores in the 
exploratory group than in the confirmatory group. Regressions on the posttest 
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multiple choice score were calculated to determine the relative influences of 
variables and to identify whether there was any group X epistemological belief 
interaction. Predictor variables were entered in the following order: pretest 
score, recitation instructor, treatment group, epistemological belief, and group X 
epistemological belief (Table 7). In the final regression stage, pretest score was the 
strongest predictor (Beta= .64, .01). Treatment group was found to be 
significant (Beta= 1.15, .03) as well as epistemological belief (Beta= .32, p.< .05). 
The interaction of group X epistemological belief was significant, with a Beta of 
-1.20 (p<.03). 
In order to see the direction of the interaction, a two-dimensional 
projection of regression on posttest score with epistemological belief was graphed 
(with pretest score and recitation section set to their means). This graph 
illustrates that the members of the exploratory group with greater levels of 
epistemological sophistication performed better on the posttest, while members 
of the confirmatory group with greater levels of epistemological sophistication 
performed more poorly on the posttest (Figure 4). 
Multiple regression was run on the posttest concept comparison scores 
entering predictor variables as described above (Table 8); there were no 
significant effects for group (g< .82), epistemological belief (p< .68), or group X 
epistemological belief (g< .79). 
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Figure 4. Two-dimensional projection of regression of posttest score 
on epistemological belief, with pretest score and section set to their 
means {higher epistemological values reflect less sophistication). 
DISCUSSION 
The primary purpose of this study was to compare an exploratory to a 
confirmatory simulation experience. I hypothesized that the exploratory 
experience would produce greater conceptual change than the confirmatory 
experience. 
In the analyses of six questions used to identify alternative conceptions, two 
showed significant differences for treatment group favoring the exploratory 
learners. Four of the six means were higher for the exploratory group (for 
questions dealing with alternative conceptions). The confirmatory group 
outperformed the exploratory group on only one of the six questions. Thus, 
some evidence was found that exploratory computer simulation exercises can, in 
some cases, be significantly more effective than confirmatory exercises in 
changing alternative conceptions. In contrast to a student receiving a 
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confirmatory lesson, a student in an exploratory condition may build her/his 
own idiosyncratic (but productive) line of reasoning from hypothesizing and 
from testing the hypotheses. This exploratory process highlights not only the 
conclusion but the path of reasoning used to arrive at the conclusion. Such 
exploration may directly challenge student ideas and lead students to develop 
better conceptions. 
It was hypothesized that the level of epistemological sophistication and 
treatment would interact, with less sophisticated subjects in the exploratory 
group predicted to feel frustration at the lack of explicit direction in the 
simulation's cases. A regression on the posttest multiple choice score 
(controlling for recitation instructor) indicated not only treatment and 
epistemological belief to be significant predictors, but treatment group X 
epistemological belief to be a significant predictor of posttest score as well. The 
pattern of performance depicted in Figure 4 suggests that achievement for 
students with high levels of epistemological sophistication is optimized in an 
exploratory setting, and that students with low levels of epistemological 
sophistication appear to perform best under confirmatory conditions. Thus, the 
students' levels of epistemological sophistication and the treatment condition 
did produce the hypothesized interaction. Scores by students with moderate 
levels of epistemological sophistication did not appear to be influenced by the 
treatment conditions used in this experiment. 
The misconceptions held by the subjects were consistent with those described 
in related studies (Arnaudin & Mintzes, 1986; Mintzes, Trowbridge, Arnaudin & 
Wandersee, 1991). In general, only about half the subjects exhibited a correct 
conception about topics central to the understanding of the cardiovascular 
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system. Responses to questions in the pre- and posttest which focused on issues 
central to the cardiovascular system may have been influenced by personal 
experiences and early academic experiences related to those topics. Topics such as 
structure of the heart and pathways of blood through the circulatory system are 
more likely to be subjects of alternative conception than esoteric topics such as 
cardiac output and stroke volume (students are more likely to have a lack of 
knowledge in these latter areas rather than a preexisting belief). 
There was an interesting discrepancy between the number of students who 
chose the correct diagram of the heart (52%) versus the number of subjects who 
chose the correct textual response "four chambers" in a separate question (89%). 
Some students may lack the visual literacy to interpret basic diagrams in 
instructional materials and assessments, not necessarily having an alternative 
conception. 
The concept comparison scores were significantly related to the posttest 
multiple choice scores. The reasons for using a concept comparison were to 
furnish a second type of measure for conceptualization and to contribute to 
knowledge in the area of alternative assessment types. Concept comparisons are 
easier to evaluate than multidimensional concept maps and may be a viable 
(supplementary) method of assessing understanding with large groups of 
students. 
The natural class setting for this or any experiment helps support the intuitive 
external validity of the results. Many studies in computer-based learning have 
taken place in experimental settings. Results obtained in such settings are harder 
to generalize to classroom settings in which cross-talk between computer stations 
and other interpersonal phenomena are common. 
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The high overall achievement of both treatment groups may have been due, 
in part, to the setting of time and place. There were two presentations covering 
the cardiovascular system held in the lecture class that was associated with the 
laboratory. Almost all subjects were enrolled in this lecture. Additionally, the 
students returned to their labs after the first two-hour session with the 
simulation and did a hands-on activity directly related to the cardiovascular 
system (an actual sheep heart dissection). 
Because constructivist instructional approaches differ in many ways from 
objectivist approaches, it is difficult to conclusively attribute differences in 
student performance to particular aspects of one condition versus the other. The 
exploratory group had a context-bound, thematic instructional guide, and was 
asked to write predictions, test hypotheses, and explain phenomena (the 
confirmatory group was asked to write conclusions after each case). 
Manipulating constructivist settings in order to isolate and control certain 
variables for experimentation may, however, result in an analysis of the effects 
of parts that obscures effects of the whole. 
There are several assumptions associated with evaluating the effectiveness of 
simulations, particularly in a constructivist mode. I assumed that learners, 
without explicit instruction, could comprehend the tasks required of them 
within the simulation and that they were capable of creating testable hypotheses. 
It was further assumed that learners could make sense of the graphical/pictorial 
information on the screen and use that information to support or refute their 
hypotheses. Testing the validity of these assumptions may be the basis for 
future studies. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This study provided some evidence that an exploratory (constructivist) 
simulation experience could be more effective in altering learners' 
misconceptions than a confirmatory simulation experience. Some evidence was 
obtained consistent with the view that providing learners with overly detailed 
procedural instructions to solve problems in a simulated environment could be 
deleterious to conceptual change. Additionally, the results of this study suggest 
that the epistemological beliefs of learners interact with the type of learning 
environment in determining achievement. Students with greater 
epistemological sophistication did better in the exploratory simulation 
environment while students with less sophisticated beliefs about knowledge and 
learning achieved best in the more prescribed, confirmatory simulation 
environment. 
In addition to the specific findings described above, this study also supported 
the idea that computer-based simulations offer a suitable cognitive environment 
within which to test learners' self-resolution of alternative conceptions, 
achievement, and general response to constructivist instruction. 
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Table 1 Internal Consistencies (Cronbach's alpha): Pretest multiple 
choice, computer proficiency composite, epistemological survey, 
posttest multiple choice, posttest concept comparison. 
INSTRUMENT CRONBACH'S ALPHA NUMBER OF 
ITEMS 
Pretest multiple choice .52 24 
Computer proficiency composite .62 2 
Epistemological survey ^ .69 63 
"Seek single answers" subscale .34 11 
"Avoid integration" subscale .45 8 
"Avoid ambiguity" subscale .51 5 
"Knowledge is certain" subscale .29 6 
"Depend on authority" subscale .25 4 
"Don't criticize authority" subscale .51 6 
"Learning is innate" subscale .20 4 
"Can't learn how to learn" subscale .65 5 
"Success unrelated to hard work" subscale .46 4 
"Learn the first time" subscale .19 3 
"Learning is quick" subscale .40 5 
"Concentrated effort is a waste" subscale .13 2 
Posttest multiple choice .77 30 
Posttest concept comparison .64 23 
^ Epistemological total score was calculated by computing the means of each of 
the subscales; these subscale means were then averaged to produce the overall 
score used in subsequent analyses. 
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Table 2 Frequency distributions: Computer use, perceived proficiency. 
ITEMS VALUE N PERCENT 
FREQUENCY OF COMPUTER USE 
Once a day 1 7 3.2 
2-4 times per week 2 46 20.8 
Once a week 3 53 24.0 
Once or twice a month 4 73 33.0 
Never 5 42 19.0 
MEAN 
SD 
3.43 
1.11 
PERCEIVED COMPUTER PROFICIENCY 
Very high 1 10 
High 2 38 
Average 3 132 
Below average 4 35 
Very low 5 6 
4.5 
17.2 
59.7 
15.8 
2.7 
MEAN 2.95 
SD .79 
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Table 3 Frequencies: Selected pretest items and parallel posttest 
items. 
POSTTEST PRETEST POSTTEST 
QUESTION DISTRIBUTION DISTRIBUTION 
NUMBERS (percent of all subjects) (percent of subjects 
who answered parallel 
pretest item incorrectly) 
answer number answer number 
1 2 3 4 5  1 2 3 4 5  
#2 4.1 59.3b 20.4 14.9 1.4 20.0 35.6b 31.1 11.1 2.2 
#3 1.4 7.7 14.5 30.3 46.2b 3.4 8.4 10.9 26.1 51.3b 
#5 46.6b 0.5 4.5 46.2 2.3 58.5b 0.0 8.5 33.1 0.0 
#8 5.0 64.7b 5.9 22.2 1.8 6.5 59.7b 9.1 24.7 0.0 
#15 0.9 11.8 9.1 51.8b 26.4 0.0 9.4 0.9 61.3b 28.3 
#27 20.4 38.9 37.6b 2.3 0.5 12.4 31.4 53.3b 1.5 1.5 
^ questions can be found in Appendices B and G. 
b correct answer. 
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Table 4 Correlation coefficients: Demographic, epistemological, 
pretest, and posttest variables. 
GENDER EPIST GROUP PROFIC POST PRETEST CONG 
GENDER 
EPIST -.05 
GROUP .03 -.06 
PROFIC .06 -.14"^ -.02 
POST -.06 -.05 .04 
PRETEST -.11 -.29"-* -.10 .06 .60=^=^ 
CONG .12 .01 .04 -.07 -.32"^=^ -.11 
< .05 
.01 
Legend: 
GENDER- gender of subject 
EPIST- epistemological sophistication (lower value=greater sophistication) 
GROUP- confirmatory (value=l), exploratory (value=2) 
PROFIC- composite computer proficiency self-rating 
POST- posttest multiple choice score 
PRETEST- pretest score 
CONG- posttest concept comparison score 
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Table 5 Means and standard deviations: Epistemological 
survey, pretest, posttest multiple choice, and 
concept comparison measures. 
VARIABLE 
Epistemological 
belief 
Pretest 
Posttest 
(multiple choice) 
Posttest 
(concept comparison) 
CONFIRMATORY 
MEAN SD N 
2.57 .26 108 
16.12 2.85 112 
22.23 4.70 112 
1.47 .45 109 
EXPLORATORY 
MEAN SD N 
2.54 .25 104 
15.49 3.31 109 
21.79 3.87 109 
1.51 .50 108 
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Table 6 Means and standard deviations for each treatment: Posttest 
questions 15, 8, 2,3, 5, and 27.^ 
CONFIRMATORY EXPLORATORY 
JESTION N MEAN SD N MEAN SD 
#15 55 .53 .50 51 .71 .46 
#8 37 .51 .51 40 .67 .48 
#2 42 .45 .50 48 .27 .44 
#3 54 .48 .50 65 .54 .50 
#5 58 .60 .49 60 .57 .50 
#27 63 .49 .50 74 .57 .50 
Legend: 
Question #15 (structure of heart) 
Question #8 ( oxygen path after entering lungs) 
Question #2 (blood flow to intestinal region) 
Question #3 (path of blood in circulatory system) 
Question #5 (blood flow to brain) 
Question #27 (oxygen content of blood in atria) 
^ Full text of questions found in Appendix G. 
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Table 7 Multiple regression: posttest multiple choice score. 
PREDICTOR B Beta t P 
Step 1 
Pretest score .97 .65 12.40 
Constant 6.65 5.24 .01 
Step 2 
Pretest score .96 .65 12.33 .01=^=^ 
Recitation instructor -.69 -.08 -1.52 .13 
Constant 7.85 5.27 .01 
Step 3 
Pretest score .96 .65 12.25 .OP* 
Recitation instructor -.69 -.08 -1.51 .13 
Group -.05 -.01 -.11 .91 
Constant 7.93 4.76 .01 
Step 4 
Pretest score .95 .64 11.49 .01'^'' 
Recitation instructor -.71 -.08 -1.54 .13 
Group -.06 -.01 -.14 .89 
Epistemological Belief -.29 -.02 -.31 .75 
Final solution 
Pretest score .95 .64 11.54 .01'^=' 
Recitation instructor -.86 -.10 -1.90 .07 
Group 9.88 1.15 2.18 .03* 
Epistemological Belief 5.38 .32 1.97 .05* 
Group X Epist. Belief -3.88 -1.20 -2.20 .03* 
Constant -5.37 -.74 .46 
* pi< .05 
.01 
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Table 8 Multiple regression: posttest concept comparison score. ^ 
PREDICTOR B Beta t 
Pretest score -.63 -.16 -2.24 .03"^ 
Recitation instructor 2.38 .11 1.52 .13 
Group -3.42 -.15 -.22 .82 
Epistemological Belief -3.82 -.09 -.41 .68 
Group X Epist. Belief 1.59 .19 .27 .79 
Constant 49.28 1.99 .05 
.05 
^ Final solution. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
There is evidence that computer simulations can contribute to the 
conceptualization of phenomena and that the process of conceptual change can 
be facilitated by the implementation of simulations in the learning 
environment. The idea that simulations or any other computer-related 
technology can serve as a stand-alone instructional method is unsupported. A 
clearly defined advantage for exploratory over confirmatory simulation 
experiences for altering misconceptions is also unsupported by the results of this 
study. There is however, evidence that the level of epistemological 
sophistication of the learner can interact with the type of learning environment, 
resulting in greater achievement gains by those with higher sophistication levels 
when placed in a constructivist setting. 
There are several challenges to researchers in the area of constructivist uses of 
simulations to promote conceptual change. One is that constructivist 
instructional theory offers an approach to learning that involves many 
variations from traditional instruction, making it difficult to isolate variables for 
experimental manipulation. Another challenge is to find accurate measures of 
conceptual change, perhaps by employing more process-oriented measures. 
Developing more refined typologies for: simulations, uses of simulations 
within the larger learning environment, conceptions, and alternative 
conceptions will help clarify the discourse in the area of conceptual change 
strategies. The role of the learner's epistemological disposition in achievement 
and conceptual change is also a viable area for continued study. 
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As the role of computers expands in our schools it is necessary to chart a course 
of research that stays abreast of the emerging technologies and how they interface 
with the characteristics of the learner as well as the overall learning 
environment. 
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Directions: There are no right or wrong answers for the following questions. We 
want to know what you really believe. For each statement, fill in the oval 
corresponding to whether you disagree or agree. 
(l=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral 4=agree 5=strongly agree) 
27. If you are ever going to be able to understand something, it will make sense to 
you the first time you hear it. 
28. The only thing that is certain is uncertainty itself. 
29. For success in school, it is best not to ask too many questions. 
30. A course in study skills would probably be valuable. 
31. How much a person gets out of school depends mostly on the teacher. 
32. You can believe almost everything you read. 
33. I often wonder how much my teachers really know. 
34. The ability to learn is innate. 
35. It is annoying to listen to a lecturer who cannot seem to make up his/her 
mind as to what he/she really believes. 
36. Successful students understand things quickly. 
37. A good teacher's job is to keep her/his students from wandering off the right 
track. 
38. If scientists try hard enough, they can find the truth to almost anything. 
39. People who challenge authority are over-confident. 
40.1 try my best to combine information across chapters or even across classes. 
41. The most successful people have discovered how to improve their ability to 
learn. 
42. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe. 
105 
43. The most important aspect of scientific work is precise measurement and 
careful work. 
(l=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral 4=agree 5=strongly agree) 
44. To me, studying means getting big ideas from the text, rather than details. 
45. Educators should know by now which is the best method, lectures or small 
group discussions. 
46. Going over and over a difficult textbook chapter usually won't help you 
understand it. 
47. Scientists can ultimately get to the truth. 
48. You never know what a book means unless you know the intent of the 
author. 
49. The most important part of scientific work is original thinking. 
50. If I find the time to re-read a textbook chapter, I get a lot more out of it the 
second time. 
51. Students have a lot of control over how much they can get out of a textbook. 
52. Genius is 10% ability and 90% hard work. 
53. I find it refreshing to think about issues that authorities can't agree on. 
54. Everyone needs to learn how to learn. 
55. When you first encounter a difficult concept in a textbook, it's best to work it 
out on your own. 
56. A sentence has little meaning unless you know the situation in which it was 
spoken. 
57. Being a good student generally involves memorizing facts. 
58. Wisdom is not knowing the answers, but knowing how to find the answers. 
59. Most words have one clear meaning. 
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60. Truth is unchanging. 
(l=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral 4=agree 5=strongly agree) 
61. If a person forgot details, and yet was able to come up with new ideas from a 
text, I would think they were bright. 
62. Whenever I encounter a difficult problem in life, I consult with my parents. 
63. Learning definitions word-for-word is often necessary to do well on tests. 
64. When I study, I look for the specific facts. 
65. If a person can't understand something within a short amount of time, they 
should keep on trying. 
66. Sometimes you just have to accept answers from a teacher even though you 
don't understand them. 
67. If professors would stick more to the facts and do less theorizing, one would 
get more out of college. 
68. I don't like movies that don't have an ending. 
69. Getting ahead takes a lot of work. 
70. It's a waste of time to work on problems which have no possibility of coming 
out with a clear-cut and unambiguous answer. 
71. You should evaluate the accuracy of information in a textbook, if you are 
familiar with the topic. 
72. Often, even advice from experts should be questioned. 
73. Some people are born good learners, others are just stuck with limited ability. 
74. Nothing is certain but death and taxes. 
75. The really smart students don't have to work hard to do well in school. 
76. Working hard on a difficult problem for an extended period of time only pays 
off for really smart students. 
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77. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely just 
end up being confused. 
(l=strongly disagree 2=disagree 3=neutral 4=agree 5=strongly agree) 
78. Almost all the information you can learn from a textbook you will get during 
the first reading. 
79. Usually you will figure out difficult concepts if you eliminate all outside 
distractions and really concentrate. 
80. A really good way to understand a textbook is to reorganize the information 
according to your own personal scheme. 
81. Students who are "average" in school will remain "average" for the rest of 
their lives. 
82. A tidy mind is an empty mind. 
83. An expert is someone who has a special gift in some area. 
84. I really appreciate instructors who organize their lectures meticulously and 
then stick to their plan. 
85. The best thing about science courses is that most problems have only one 
right answer. 
86. Learning is s slow process of building up knowledge. 
87. Today's facts may be tomorrow's fiction, 
88. Self-help books are not much help. 
89. You will just get confused if you try to integrate new ideas in a textbook with 
knowledge you already have about a topic. 
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Zoology 156 Lab 
This questionnaire is designed to measure your understanding of the 
cardiovascular system. No names are needed. 
* Fill in the appropriate oval for your gender (sex). 
Fill in the oval on the answer sheet corresponding to the one best answer to each 
question. 
1. How often do you use a computer (for any reason)? 
a. usually at least once a day 
b. usually 2-4 times a week 
c. usually about once a week 
d. usually once or twice a month 
e. never 
2. As a student, how would you rate your general proficiency in using the 
computer? 
a. very high 
b. high 
c. average 
d. below average 
e. very low 
3. During activity, what happens to blood vessels in the exercising muscle 
groups? 
a. they remain the same diameter as during rest 
b. they constrict slightly ( smaller in diameter) 
c. they constrict substantially (smaller in diameter) 
d. they dilate (become larger in diameter) 
e. the exercising muscle groups do not require blood flow 
4. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the intestinal 
region? 
a. it remains the same as during rest 
b. it decreases 
c. it increases slightly 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the intestinal region does not require blood flow 
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b. a. 
d. e. 
5. Which diagram best depicts the flow of blood after it leaves the heart on its 
way to an extremity such as the toe? 
a. The blood goes to the toe, and remains there, --(heart toe) 
b. The blood goes to the toe then back to the heart, --(heart toe heart) 
c. The blood goes to the toe, then to the lungs, then to the heart, —(heart 
toe lung heart) 
d. The blood goes to the lungs first, then to the toe, then back to the heart, 
—(heart lung toe heart) 
e. The blood goes to the toe, then to the heart, then to the lungs, then back 
to the heart, —(double circulation) 
I l l  
6. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the exercising 
muscle groups? 
a. it remains about the same as during rest 
b. it shuts off entirely 
c. it decreases slightly 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the major muscle groups do not require blood flow 
7. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the brain? 
a. it remains about the same as during rest 
b. it is shut off entirely 
c. it decreases substantially 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the brain does not usually require blood flow 
8. Where does oxygen go after it enters your lungs? 
a. air tubes from the lungs carry oxygen throughout the body 
b. blood in vessels carries oxygen from the lungs through the heart 
c. air tubes carry oxygen from the lungs through the heart 
d. blood in vessels carries oxygen directly to the body 
e. the oxygen remains in the lungs and is then exhaled 
9. Arteries are vessels in the body that: 
a. transport air from the lungs to other parts of the body. 
b. transport air from the lungs to the heart. 
c. transport blood both to and from the heart. 
d. transport blood to the heart. 
e. transport blood away from the heart. 
10. Veins are vessels in the body that: 
a. have higher blood pressure than arteries. 
b. have lower blood pressure than arteries. 
c. have generally the same blood pressure as arteries. 
d. usually have no blood pressure in them at all. 
e. have higher blood pressure in them if they are located in the top 
half of the body. 
For questions 11 through 14, mark "A" on your answer sheet if the statement is 
TRUE, and "B" if the statement is false. 
11. A function of the heart is to filter impurities from the blood. 
12. A function of the heart is to pump blood. 
13. A function of the heart is to create blood. 
14. A function of the heart is to store blood. 
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15. What does the internal structure of the human heart look like? (as above) 
a. figure "a" 
b. figure "b" 
c. figure "c" 
d. figure "d" 
e. figure "e" 
16. What is the relationship in blood pressure between arteries and veins? 
a. they have equal blood pressures 
b. arteries always have higher blood pressure 
c. veins always have higher blood pressure 
d. the vein pressure is higher only in a fit individual 
e. artery pressure will be greater only if the individual is engaging in 
exercise 
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17. Blood in some blood vessels of the body is high in oxygen. Blood in these 
vessels contain about what percent oxygen? 
a. 20% 
b. 40% 
c. 60% 
d. 80% 
e. 95% 
18. When moving from rest to exercise, heart rate should 
a. increase 
b. decrease 
c. remain the same 
d. decrease substantially, then increase 
e. increase or decrease depending on your level of fitness 
Definition: stroke volume = the amount of blood pumped in one heartbeat 
19. When moving from rest to exercise, stroke volume should 
a. increase 
b. decrease 
c. remain the same 
d. decrease substantially, then increase 
e. increase or decrease depending on your level of fitness 
20. At rest, a well trained runner will have 
a. a lower stroke volume than an unfit person. 
b. a higher heart rate than an unfit person. 
c. a lower heart rate than an unfit person. 
d. a higher maximal heart rate than an unfit person. 
e. both a and c are correct. 
21. At rest, an unfit individual will have 
a. the same blood pressure as an athlete. 
b. slightly lower blood pressure than an athlete. 
c. much lower blood pressure than an athlete. 
d. higher blood pressure than an athlete. 
e. almost no blood pressure at all. 
Definition; cardiac output = (heart rate) X (volume of blood pumped per 
heartbeat). 
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22. How does cardiac output change when you go from a resting state to a state of 
activity? 
a. it increases 
b. it decreases slightly 
c. it decreases substantially 
d. it remains the same 
e. it changes, but the direction is dependent upon the level of fitness 
23. How is cardiac output different between a fit and unfit person when at rest? 
a. cardiac output is about the same for both 
b. cardiac output is greater for the unfit person 
c. cardiac output is greater for the fit person 
d. different, but the direction is dependent upon gender 
e. different, but the direction is dependent upon age 
24. How is cardiac output different between a fit and unfit person when 
exercising? 
a. cardiac output is the same for both 
b. cardiac output is greater for the unfit person 
c. cardiac output is greater for the fit person 
d. different, but the direction is dependent upon your gender 
e. different, but the direction is dependent upon your age 
25. In the atria of the heart, would you find blood that is relatively high in 
oxygen or low in oxygen? 
a. low 
b. high 
c. depends on which atrium 
d. a mixture of high and low 
e. blood does not enter the atria 
26. How many chambers are there in the human heart? 
a. one chamber 
b. two chambers 
c. three chambers 
d. four chambers 
e. five chambers 
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116 Confirm 
The Cardiovascular System 
You will be using a computer simulation of the cardiovascular system. You won't need to use the 
keyboard for this program, just the mouse. 
For each step, please read the entire paragraph of instructions before making any moves in the 
simulation, some important cautions may be expressed later in the paragraph! 
Sometimes you will be asked to click and hold the mouse button down (referred to as "click and 
hold'), sometimes you'll be asked to hold the mouse down and move the mouse (referred 
to as "dick and drag"). Most of the time you will be asked just to click on an area. There is 
never a need to double-click in this program. 
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The left window will have line, pie and bar graphs and numerical counters that indicate any kind of 
information you choose. It is important to note the units used in the graphs. The horizontal axis on 
the line graphs represents brief cycles of time (not necessarily seconds). 
The right window can have up to four smaller windows in it. They are explained on the next page... 
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Quick Guide to your Control Window... 
Resets 
everything 
to original 
conditions 
\ 
The "Go" 
button 
Stops simula­
tion 
You can click and hold the mouse 
down on most parts of the body or 
heart and see the name of that 
part. 
Allows you to 
go step by 
step 
Body^^ear^TRonit^ Joqqer 
Blood Pressure^ 126.b 
vXLZl 
iBIood Pressure"^ 
This 
diplays 
the blood 
pressure 
of wher­
ever the 
#1 detec­
tor is 
placed by 
you. 
— Monitor 
Click and hold here to select whether 
This detector (#1) has been dragged to an artery n,onitor shows blood pressure, % 
in the head and the blood pressure of that oxygen, % carbon dioxide, or % 
artery is shown in the monitor as 126.6. The #2 Blood pressure selected here 
detector has been dragged to a neck vein, and is example 
showing a pressure of 6.0 in the monitor win­
dow. 
Click and hold to select 
"Normal", "Athlete", or" 
"Couch Potato" 
CI Muscle 
Activity 
Normal 
— Make jogger run 
Make jogger walk 
. Click here to make 
jogger stand still 
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In the left window of your computer you should 
see the words "Main Menu". Read the names of 
the buttons. Click once on the tan button "Go to 
HEART RATE". You'll see a graph of the heart 
rate in beats per unit time. 
Because there are two windows (left and right), 
you sometimes have to click once anywhere in 
the window to make it "active" before you can 
click on a button. You can tell which window is 
active because it will have horizontal bars across 
the top of the title bar. Click once on the "Go" 
icon^ (the running figure). If you have 
trouble, don't be afraid to ask for help. 
Now, in the jogger window. 
O Muscle Q 
Activity 
click once on the middle 
Normal 
circle to make the figure walk. Check the graph, 
are there any changes in the heart rate? Note that 
heart rate is also shown in digital form below the 
line graph. 
'^Important note! When making changes in the 
simulation, you should observe the graph 
changes for at least thirty seconds before making 
any judgments or recording data. It takes that 
long for the simulated body to react! 
Now, at the bottom of the jogger window, click 
and hold on the word "Normal". Drag the 
mouse down to the word "Athlete" and let up on 
the mouse button. Did this change the graph? 
You may create any combination of resting, 
walking or running for a normal person, athlete 
(fit person), or "couch potato" (unfit person). 
We won't use the other person types in this 
simulation. 
Hm Now click on the "Stop" icon Wl(the stop sign 
with hand). If you now click on the "Reset" 
(crouched runner) jgJ j all the original conditions 
will be reset. 
There is a slider bar at the bottom of the screen 
labeled "cc's of blood in body". 
5000 
Click and drag the small 
cc's of blood In body 
white rectangle on the slider bar to change the 
amount of blood in the person's body. 
Now let's click on the "Go to MAIN MENU" 
button in the upper left. 
There are 12 cases that you will confirm by 
using the simulation, these conditions simulate 
actual responses by the human body. 
Case #1: Where does blood flow when it leaves 
each chamber of the heart? 
Go to the MAIN MENU and select CIRCULA­
TORY PATHWAYS. Click on the GO icon and 
observe the path of the blood cell. You may 
want to use the "Step" rather than the "Running" 
icon to see the action in slow motion. 
Decribe the where blood flows after it leaves 
each chamber: 
Case #2: What is the pattern of blood flow 
between the heart and the lungs? 
Go to the MAIN MENU and select CIRCULA­
TORY PATHWAYS again. Click on the GO 
icon and observe the path of the blood cell. You 
may want to use the "Step" rather than the 
"Running" icon to see the action in slow motion. 
Pay particular attention to the pattern of blood 
flow between the heart and lungs. 
Write a brief conclusion here: 
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Case #3: Is there a difference in blood flow to 
specific areas of the body when exercising 
versus at rest? For example: Do the kidneys, 
intestines, brain and muscles all receive the same 
blood flow during exercise that they do at rest? 
Now let's find the answer to this question with 
the simulation. Make sure you are on the "MAIN 
MENU" screen, then click once on the button 
"VESSEL RESPONSES IN DIFFERENT 
AREAS." 
On this screen you will see a line graph and 
digital readings of blood flow through different 
areas of the body. Make sure your "jogger" 
figure is set to Normal and the figure is standing 
still. Now click the GO ^ icon. 
Remember, whatever action you take, let the 
simulation run about 30 seconds before making 
any judgments. 
After about 60 seconds or 1200 cycles on the 
horizontal axis of the line graph, record the flow 
of blood through the five areas: 
kidneys: 
intestines: 
brain: 
exercising muscle groups: 
Now click on the third circle up in the jogger 
window to make the figure run. After about 60 
seconds or 1200 cycles on the horizontal axis of 
the line graph, record here the flow of blood 
through the five areas: 
kidneys: I 
intestinesj 
brain: 
exercising muscle groups: 
Write your conclusions here: 
next case. 
Case #4: Is there a difference between arteries 
and veins concerning the blood pressure within 
them and the direction of blood flow? If there 
are differences between arteries and veins con­
cerning either of these two variables, are there 
any exceptions? 
Click once on DETECT BLOOD PRESSURE 
AT SPECIFIC SITES. Click and hold on the 
different vessels on the picture of the body or the 
heart to see an identification of them. 
Find the small green dot on the monitor window 
with the number "1" on it. Click and drag this 
dot to the red vessel leading to the leg; when the 
dot darkens, let up on the mouse. Find the small 
upside down triangle at the top of the monitor 
window, click and hold on it to select "blood 
pressure". You will see the blood pressure of 
that vessel in the window to the right. 
Click and drag the blue dot with "2" on it to the 
vein coming up from the leg, and select blood 
pressure at the bottom of the monitor window. 
When you click on the GO icon, the blood 
pressures will also be read on the line graph on 
the left side of the screen. 
Start by making your jogger walk. Let the 
simulation run about 60 seconds before making 
any judgments. 
Record here the blood pressures for the artery 
and vein in the leg: 
!lepeat this procedure for the vessels in the nec 
and record the results here: 
Write a brief conclusion here: 
Click once on the MAIN MENU button for the 
Return to the MAIN MENU. Click on circula­
tory pathways, and when there, click on the GO 
icon. Note the circulating blood cell. You may 
click and hold on the vessels to see their names 
in this window. Write a brief conclusion about 
the general path of blood in arteries versus veins: 
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stabilize then record the stroke volume and heart 
rate here: 
Case #5: Is there a difference between arteries 
and veins concerning the % of oxygen and 
carbon dioxide in the blood they carry? If there 
are differences between arteries and veins con­
cerning this variable, are there any exceptions 
(be careful on this one!)? 
Start at the MAIN MENU screen. Select the 
button "%OXYGEN AND CARBON DIOXIDE 
AT SPECIFIC SITES". 
As you did in Case #2, click and drag the 
monitor's detectors (the #1 and #2 dots) to the 
vessels leading to and from the leg. Now, 
however, instead of selecting the detector to read 
blood pressure, select "% oxygen" for the #1 
detector, and % oxygen for the #2 detector. Click 
the GO icon. Record the per cents here : 
Change the figure to normal and running, now 
click the GO icon ,wait until the readings stabi­
lize then record the stroke volume and heart rate 
here: 
Write a brief conclusion here; 
Case #7: At rest, are there any significant differ­
ences between an fit and unfit individual con­
cerning heart rate and/or stroke volume? 
Stay on the STROKE VOLUME window. 
Change the figure to a couch potato and standing 
still; now click the GO icon; wait until the 
readings stabilize then record the stroke volume 
and heart rate here: 
Now find the hepatic artery and hepatic vein. 
Change the figure to an athlete and standing still, 
now click the GO icon ,wait until the readings 
stabilize then record the stroke volume and heart 
Write a brief conclusion here: 
Now find the pulmonary artery and pulmonary 
vein. Place the detectors on these vessels and 
record the results here: 
Case #8: Cardiac output= heart rate X stroke 
volume. Is cardiac output different between a fit 
and an unfit individual when they are at rest? 
How does cardiac output change when they are 
What is your conclusion? 
Case #6: Stroke volume is the amount of blood 
pumped in one heartbeat. When moving from 
rest to exercise, what if anything happens to 
stroke volume? What happens to heart rate? 
Why? Go to the MAIN MENU and click on 
STROKE VOLUME. 
Change the figure to normal and standing still, 
now click the GO icon ,wait until the readings 
exercising? 
Stay on the STROKE VOLUME window. 
Change the figure to couch potato and standing 
still, now click the GO icon, wait until the 
readings stabilize then record the cardiac output 
here: 
Change the figure to athlete and standing still, 
now click the GO icon .wait until the readings 
stabilize then record the cardiac output here: 
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What is the mathematical difference between the 
athlete's cardiac output and that of the couch 
potato? Record here: 
Change the figure to couch potato and walking, 
now click the GO icon, wait until the readings 
stabilize then record the cardiac output here: 
Change the figure to athlete and walking, now 
click the GO icon ,wait until the readings stabi­
lize then record the cardiac output here: 
read on the line graph on the left side of the 
screen. 
Let the simulation run about 60 seconds before 
making any judgments. 
Record here the blood pressures for the atrium 
and ventricle: 
Repeat this procedure for the right atrium and 
ventricle, record the results here: 
Write a brief conclusion here: 
What is the mathematical difference between the 
athlete's cardiac output and that of the couch 
potato when they are walking? 
Case #9: Are there areas of different blood 
pressure within the heart itself? 
Click once on DETECT BLOOD PRESSURE 
AT SPECIFIC SITES. Click and hold on the 
different vessels on the body or the heart to see 
an identification of them. 
Find the small green dot on the monitor window 
with the number "1" on it. Click and drag this 
dot to the left atrium of the heart (becareful 
which you identify as the "left"); when the dot 
darkens, let up on the mouse. Find the small 
upside down triangle at the top of the monitor 
window, click and hold on it. Now go down and 
select "blood pressure". You will see the blood 
pressure of that vessel in the window to the right. 
Click and drag the blue dot with "2" on it to the 
left ventricle, and select blood pressure at the 
bottom of the monitor window. When you click 
on the GO icon, the blood pressures will also be 
Case #10: How can you demonstrate which 
organ/s of the body are responsible for filtering 
waste products (other than carbon dioxide) out of 
the blood by using this simulation? 
Go to the MAIN MENU. Click once on DE­
TECT % OXYGEN OR CARBON DIOXIDE 
AT SPECIFIC SITES. Click and hold on the 
different organs in the body to see an identifica­
tion of them. 
Find the small green dot on the monitor window 
with the number "1" on it. Click and drag this 
dot to the red artery leading to the intestine; 
when the dot darkens, let up on the mouse. Find 
the small upside down triangle at the top of the 
monitor window, click and hold on it. Now go 
down and select"% waste". You will see the % 
waste in the window to the right. 
Click and drag the blue dot with "2" on it to the 
blue vein leading away from the intestine, and 
select % waste at the bottom of the monitor 
window. When you click on the GO icon, the % 
waste for both detectors will also be read on the 
line graph on the left side of the screen. 
Let the simulation run about 60 seconds before 
making any judgments. 
Record here the % waste for the artery and the 
Repeat this procedure for the vessels leading to 
and from the leg muscle, record the results here: 
Repeat this procedure for the vessels leading to 
and from the kidney, record the results here: 
At the top of the left screen, click the "Clear/ 
Reset the graph" button. Make sure the figure is 
normal and standing still. Now click and drag 
the white bar at the bottom of left window so 
you are blocking an intestine artery at 80%. Now 
click the GO icon. Wait until the pressure 
stabilizes then record the systolic pressure here: 
Write a brief conclusion here: Write a brief conclusion here: 
Case #11: Go to the Main Menu. Which of the 
following factors will cause the systolic blood 
pressure to rise in a person: being physically fit, 
going from rest to activity, raising the volume of 
blood in the body, or blocking major blood 
vessels? It may be more than one factor. 
Choose the button "BLOOD PRESSURE". 
Make sure your jogger is set to Normal and is 
walking. Now click the GO icon. Wait until the 
pressure stabilizes then record the systolic 
pressure here: 
Now as the figure is still walking, change it to an 
athlete. Wait until the pressure stabilizes, then 
record the systolic pressure here: 
Change the figure to normal and standing still, 
wait until the systolic pressure stabilizes then 
record the systolic pressure here: 
Now make the figure an athlete and standing, 
wait until the systolic pressure stabilizes then 
record the systolic pressure here: 
Change the figure to normal and standing still, 
now click and drag the white bar in the left 
window so the blood volume is 6000 cc's. Now 
click the GO icon. Wait until the pressure 
stabilizes then record the systolic pressure here: 
How does this compare with your earlier reading 
of a normal individual standing still with a 
normal blood volume of 5000 cc's? 
Case #12: Diastolic blood pressure is measured 
during the relaxation phase of the heart. When a 
person who is standing still begins to exercise, 
does the diastolic pressure change significantly? 
Stay in the BLOOD PRESSURE window. 
Change the figure to normal and standing still, 
now click the GO icon. Wait until the pressure 
stabilizes then record the diastolic pressure here: 
Change the figure to normal and running, now 
click the GO icon. Wait until the pressure 
stabilizes then record the diastolic pressure here: 
Write a brief conclusion here: 
You are now done with your 12 cases, if you 
have finished ahead of others, go back and 
re-check your results! 
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Tfie Cardiovascular System 
Explore 
You will be using a computer simulation of the cardiovascular system. You won't need to 
use the keyboard for this program, just the mouse. 
For each step, please read the entire paragraph of instructions before making any moves in 
the simulation, some important cautions may be expressed later in the paragraph! 
Sometimes you will be asked to click and hold the mouse button down (referred to as 
"click and hold"), sometimes you'll be asked to hold the mouse down and move the mouse 
(referred to as "click and drag"). Most of the time you will be asked just to click on an area. 
There is never a need to double-click in this program. 
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The left window will have line, bar, and pie graphs and numerical counters that indicate 
any kind of information you choose. It is important to note the units used in the graphs. 
The horizontal axis on the line graphs represents brief cycles of time (not necessarily sec­
onds). 
The right window can have up to four smaller windows in it. They are explained on the 
next page... 
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Quick Guide to your Control Window... 
Resets 
everything 
to original 
conditions 
\ 
The "Go" 
button 
Stops simula­
tion 
You can click and hold the mouse 
down on most parts of the body or 
heart and see the name of that 
part. 
Allows you to 
go step by 
step 
Bod^^^HearTlMonUor Joqqer 
jik 
^ .... 
5^ 
jf. 
Blood Pressure 26.6 
"Y 
Blood Pressure 
This 
diplays 
the blood 
pressure 
of wher­
ever the 
#1 detec­
tor is 
placed by 
you. 
— Monitor 
Click and hold here to select whether 
This detector (#1) has been dragged to an artery monitor shows blood pressure, % 
in the head and the blood pressure of that oxygen, % carbon dioxide, or % 
artery is shown in the monitor as 126.6. The #2 -waste. Blood pressure selected here 
detector has been dragged to a neck vein, and is example. 
showing a pressure of 6.0 in the monitor win­
dow. 
Click and hold to select 
"Normal", "Athlete", or' 
"Couch Potato" 
Muscle 
Activity 
Normal 
— Make jogger run 
Make jogger walk 
Click here to make 
jogger stand still 
In the left window of your screen you 
should see the words "Main Menu". Read 
the names of the tan colored buttons. Click 
once on "Go to HEART RATE". You'll see a 
graph of the heart rate in beats per unit 
time. 
Because there are two windows (left and 
right), you sometimes have to click once 
anywhere in the window to make it "active" 
before you can click on a button. You can 
tell which window is active because it will 
have horizontal bars across the top of the 
title bar. Click once on the "Go" 
icon*^ (the running figure). If you have 
trouble, don't be afraid to ask for help. 
You may create any combination of resting, 
walking or running for a normal person, 
athlete (fit person), or "couch potato" (unfit 
person). We won't use the other person 
types in this simulation. 
Now click on the "Stop" icon HiJ[(the stop 
sign with hand). If you now click on the 
"Reset" (crouched runner) i all the origi­
nal conditions will be reset. 
There is a slider bar at the bottom of the 
screen labeled "cc's of blood in body". 
5000 
Now, in the jogger window. 
Muscle B 
Activity [7 
Normal click once on the middle 
circle to make the figure walk. Are there 
any changes in the heart rate? 
Note that heart rate is also shown in digital 
form below the line graph. 
*Important note! When making changes in 
the simulation, you should observe the 
graph changes for at least thirty seconds 
before making any judgments or recording 
data. It takes that long for the simulated 
body to react! 
Now, at the bottom of the jogger window, 
click and hold on the word "Normal". Drag 
the mouse down to the word "Athlete" and 
let up on the mouse button. Did this change 
the graph? 
cc's of blood In body 
Click and drag the 
small white rectangle on the slider bar to 
change the amount of blood in the person's 
body. 
Now let's click on the "Go to MAIN 
MENU" button in the upper left. 
Here is a summary of what the buttons in the 
main menu zuill show you... 
CIRCULATORY PATHWAYS: Simply show 
path of single blood cell through circulatory 
system. 
HEART RATE: Line graph and digital 
reading of heart rate. 
BLOOD PRESSURE: Systolic and diastolic 
blood pressures (line graph and digital) as 
well as slider bars to change body's blood 
volume and simulate the blockage of an 
artery. 
CHAMBERS OF THE HEART; Bar and line 
graphs of volume and blood pressure in 
each chamber of the heart. 
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VESSEL RESPONSES IN VARIOUS AREAS: 
Line graph and digital reading of blood flow 
through several areas of the body simulta­
neously. 
STROKE VOLUME: Bar and line graphs of 
stroke volume, heart rate, and cardiac out­
put (stroke volume X heart rate) 
DETECT BLOOD PRESSURE AT SPECIFIC 
SITES: ("^Nothing will show on this graph 
unless you place the detectors somewhere 
first!) Line graph with vertical axis scaled to 
read blood pressure (max of 200 mm Hg). 
The "Monitor" subwindow is shown on the 
right side of screen, and detectors can be 
clicked and dragged to specific places on 
heart OR body subwindows. 
DETECT BLOOD FLOW THROUGH VES­
SELS AT SPECIFIC SITES: ("^Nothing will 
show on this graph unless you place the 
detectors somewhere first!)Line graph with 
vertical axis scaled to read blood flow(max 
of 20000 cc's min.). The "Monitor" 
subwindow is shown on the right side of 
screen, and detectors can be clicked and 
dragged to specific places on heart OR body 
subwindows. 
DETECT % OXYGEN, CARBON DIOXIDE, 
OR WASTE AT SPECIFIC SITES: (-^Nothing 
will show on this graph unless you place the 
detectors somewhere first!)Line graph with 
vertical axis scaled to read % of oxygen, 
carbon dioxide or waste (max of 100%). The 
"Monitor" subwindow is shown on the 
right side of screen, and detectors can be 
clicked and dragged to specific places on 
heart OR body subwindows. 
Here are 12 cases that you will explore by 
using the simulation, these conditions 
simulate actual responses by the human 
body. Use your imagination to test the 
hypotheses that you state for each case 
(hypotheses= your prediction). All ques­
tions below can be answered using the 
simulation. 
You will be exploring the story of Lynn 
Heartman, an Iowa State sophomore whose 
body will be used in this computer simulation. 
Lynn's story, which is made up of 11 different 
cases, will furnish you with a theme that will 
help you understand the circulatory system 
better. 
Case #1: Lyrm is a couch potato who has not 
exercised for several years. The heart plays a 
major role in everyone's health and is central 
to the cardiovascular system. We should 
examine Lyrm's heart and discover how it 
functions before we move on to more serious 
questions about Lyrm's health. 
Before using the simulation, write briefly 
where you believe blood flows when it leaves 
each chamber of the heart. Include all cham­
bers in your explanation. 
Now test your answers by using the simula­
tion. Start on the main menu screen, and select 
the tan buttons on the left that you think will 
furnish you with information necessary. 
Record whether you were correct or not. If 
you weren't completely correct about each 
chamber, record the correct answers below. 
Case #2: Lynn notices that it is time for a 
yearly physical checkup and schedules an 
appointment. During the routine physical 
examination, Lynn's doctor discovers blood 
clots in two blood vessels. The doctor says this 
is a serious condition since the clots are likely 
to move gradually through the vessels with 
the flow of blood until they come to an 
organ. They will cause serious damage to 
the next organ they enter. One clot is in the 
pulmonary artery. If the clot moves with the 
flow of blood, what is the next organ that the 
clot is likely to encounter? Before using the 
simulation, write your prediction here: 
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Now use the simulation to determine where 
that clot is likely to go. 
Describe briefly the path of blood between 
the heart and the lungs: 
Write whether you were correct in your 
prediction. 
The other c ot is located in the pulmonary 
vein. Predict what organ will this clot en­
counter next and write it here: 
Now use the simulation to determine where 
Write whet 
prediction. 
ler you were correct in your 
Case #3: After successful surgery to remove 
the two blood clots, Lynn decides it is time 
to start exercising. The first stop is the 
doctor's office for a treadmill test. While 
walking on the treadmill, Lyrm wonders 
about the flow of blood to different areas of 
the body during exercise versus at rest. 
Is there a difference in blood flow to specific 
areas of the body when exercising versus at 
rest? For example: Do the kidneys, intes­
tines, brain and the exercising muscles 
groups all receive the same blood flow 
during exercise that they do at rest? 
Write your predictions here and explain 
briefly: 
Kidneys; 
Intestines: 
Brain: 
Exercising muscle groups: 
Now make sure you start on the MAIN 
MENU screen. Test your prediction with the 
simulation. You may want to try the VES­
SEL RESPONSES IN DIFFERENT AREAS 
button. Remember, whatever screen you 
choose, let the simulation run at least 60 
seconds before making any judgments, and 
don't try changing two variables at a time; 
you won't know which variable is causing 
the effect! 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num­
bers about each organ and whether the 
blood flow fluctuated more than 10%. State 
a conclusion. 
Case #4; Is there a difference between 
Lynn's arteries and veins concerning the 
blood pressure within them and the direc­
tion of blood flow? If there are differences 
between arteries and veins concerning either 
of these two variables, are there any excep­
tions? Be thorough in testing this one! 
Write your prediction here and explain 
briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion. You may want to try a couple different 
windows for this case. Remember, what­
ever screen you choose, let the simulation 
run about 60 seconds before making any 
judgments, and don't try changing two 
variables at a time; you won't know which 
variable is causing the effect! 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num-
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Case #5: The doctor takes a blood sample 
from Lynn. The doctor tells Lynn that when 
blood is in contact with oxygen it turns red. 
Is there a difference between arteries and 
veins concerning the % of oxygen and 
carbon dioxide in the blood they carry? If 
there are differences between arteries and 
veins concerning this variable, are there any 
exceptions (be careful on this one!)? 
Write your prediction here and explain 
briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion. Remember to set Lynn's condition as 
"Couch Potato"! 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num­
bers about the heart rate and stroke volume. 
State a conclusion. 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion. You may want to try a couple different 
windows for this case. Remember, what­
ever screen you choose, let the simulation 
run about 60 seconds before making any 
judgments, and don't try changing two 
variables at a time; you won't know which 
variable is causing the effect! 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num­
bers. State a conclusion. 
Case #7: Lynn is disappointed in the results 
of the treadmill test and plans to begin 
exercising regularly. Lynn asks the doctor if 
a person who becomes an athlete will see a 
change in heart rate or stroke volimie when 
at rest. Are there any significant differences 
between an fit and unfit individual concern­
ing heart rate and/or stroke volume when 
they are at rest? 
Before using the simulation, write your 
prediction here and explain briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num­
bers. State a conclusion. 
Case #6: The doctor places Lyrm on a tread­
mill and mentions that he will measure 
several things during Lynn's exercise. The 
doctor says he will measure heart rate at rest 
versus during exercise. He also says he will 
measure "stroke volume" which is the 
amount of blood pumped in one heartbeat. 
When moving from rest to exercise, what if 
anything happens to stroke volume? What 
happens to heart rate? Why? 
Before using the simulation, write your 
prediction here and explain briefly: 
Case #8: The doctor tells Lynn that heart 
rate and stroke volume work together to 
furnish the body with blood at certain rates. 
Cardiac output= heart rate X stroke volume. 
Is cardiac output significantly different 
between a fit and an unfit individual when 
they are at rest? Is cardiac output signifi­
cantly different between a fit and an unfit 
individual when they are exercising? 
Before using the simulation, write your 
predictions here. 
Now test your prediction with the simulation. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case with the 
simulation, include specific numbers. State a 
conclusion 
Case #9: Lynn can now understand from conver­
sations with the doctor that the heart develops a 
powerful pumping action, and is also a complex 
organ. Are there areas of different blood pres­
sure within the heart itself? List the chambers, 
and what you predict their blood pressure is (just 
write "very high", "low" ect..). 
Before using the simulation, write your predic­
tion here and explain briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simulation. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case with 
the simulation, include specific numbers about 
each chamber. State a conclusion. 
Case #10: By the end of the school year, Lyrm has 
improved in cardiovascular fitness. Lynn does 
have one problem though; another visit to the 
doctor reveals that Lynn's blood contains too 
much metabolic waste. This isn't carbon dioxide, 
but other metabolic wastes that the body usually 
filters out of the blood. By using this simulation, 
how can you demonstrate which organ/s of the 
body are responsible for filtering waste products 
(other than carbon dioxide) out of the blood ? 
Before using the simulation, write your predic-
tion here and explain briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simulation. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case with 
the simulation, include specific numbers and 
names of organs. State a conclusion. 
Case #11: Systolic blood pressure is the 
blood pressure measured during the stron­
gest portion of the heartbeat. Which of the 
following factors will cause the systolic 
blood pressure to rise in a person: being 
physically fit, going from rest to activity, 
raising the volume of blood in the body, or 
blocking major blood vessels? It may be 
more than one factor. 
Write your prediction here and explain 
briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion. 
Briefly describe how you tested this case 
with the simulation, include specific num­
bers. State a conclusion. 
Case #12: Diastolic blood pressure is 
measured during the relaxation phase of 
the heart. When a person who is standing 
still begins to exercise, does the diastolic 
pressure change significantly? 
Write your prediction here and explain 
briefly: 
Now test your prediction with the simula­
tion State a conclusion. 
This concludes your case study of Lynn 
Heartman, if you are done before 
others, recheck some of your earlier 
conclusions. 
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APPENDIX E. CONCEPT COMPARISON POSTTEST 
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Directions: This exercise is designed to measure how closely associated you 
believe two concepts are. All the concept terms deal with the cardiovascular 
system, but some pairs are more closely related than others. For each pair, 
determine how closely related you believe they are, then mark on the answer 
sheet a number 1 through 5: 
1) no relationship —> 5) very closely related 
You may want to look at a few pairs before beginning to mark! 
Closeness may be defined as: 
• two terms that are direct opposites 
• a term being a part or example of it's partner 
• cause and effect relationships 
•terms that directly share characteristics 
Examples: 
hair follicles skin 1 2 3 4 5 
(answer 3 or 4 indicating a moderate relationship) 
stomach earlobe 1_ 2 3 4 5 
(answer 1 or 2 indicating little or no relationship) 
digestion excretion 1 2 3 4 ^ 
(answer 4 or 5 indicating a strong relationship) 
1) no relationship —> 5) very closely related 
31. ventricle stroke volume 
32. carbon dioxide arteries 
35. stroke volume 
34. heart 
33. artery high blood pressure 
lungs 
high fitness 
36. physical activity heart rate Continued... 
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1) no relationship —> 5) very closely related 
37. vessel diameter blood pressure 
38. low fitness arteries 
39. atrium ventricle 
40. blood vessel heart 
41. lungs blood pressure 
42. heart rate vessel diameter 
43. vein artery 
44. blood flow vessel diameter 
45. oxygen capillaries 
46. blood pressure stroke volume 
47. blood pressure adrenaline 
48. exercise vessel diameter 
49. blood flow activity 
50. cardiac output heart rate 
51. capillary vein 
52. ventricle heart 
53. cardiac output capillary 
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APPENDIX F. EXPERT'S RATINGS OF CONCEPT COMPARISONS 
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Expert's ratings of concept comparisons ^ 
CONCEPT PAIRS 
ventricle 
carbon dioxide 
artery 
heart 
stroke volume 
physical activity 
vessel diameter 
low fitness 
atrium 
blood vessel 
lungs 
heart rate 
vein 
blood flow 
oxygen 
blood pressure 
blood pressure 
exercise 
blood flow 
cardiac output 
capillary 
ventricle 
cardiac output 
stroke volume 
arteries 
high blood pressure 
lungs 
highfitness 
heart rate 
blood pressure 
arteries 
ventricle 
heart 
blood pressure 
vessel diameter 
artery 
vessel diameter 
capillaries 
stroke volume 
adrenaline 
vessel diameter 
activity 
heart rate 
vein 
heart 
capillary 
MEAN RATING SD 
4.71 0.49 
2.86 1.21 
4.00 0.58 
4.14 1.07 
4.14 1.21 
4.14 1.07 
4.86 0.38 
1.71 1.25 
4.86 0.38 
4.43 0.79 
2.43 1.51 
3.14 1.57 
5.00 0.00 
4.86 0.38 
4.29 0.76 
3.71 1.25 
4.43 0.53 
4.57 0.53 
4.86 0.38 
4.71 0.49 
3.86 0.69 
4.57 0.79 
1.71 1.11 
3 Concept pairs rated by seven human physiology experts. 
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APPENDIX G. MULTIPLE CHOICE POSTTEST 
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Zoology 156 Lab post 
This questionnaire is designed to measure your understanding of the 
cardiovascular system. No names are needed. 
Please don't mark on the question sheet itself. 
* In columns B through J, under identification number, please fill in your 
social security number on the answer sheet. 
"*• In columns O and P, fill in your section number. 
Fill in the oval on the answer sheet corresponding to the one best answer to 
each question. 
1. During activity, what happens to blood vessels in the exercising muscle 
groups? 
a. they remain the same diameter as during rest 
b. they constrict slightly ( smaller in diameter) 
c. they constrict substantially (smaller in diameter) 
d. they dilate (become larger in diameter) 
e. the exercising muscle groups do not require blood flow 
2. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the intestinal 
region? 
a. it remains the same as during rest 
b. it decreases 
c. it increases slightly 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the intestinal region does not require blood flow 
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b. a. c. 
e. d. 
3. Which diagram best depicts the flow of blood after it leaves the heart on its 
way to an extremity such as the toe? 
a. The blood goes to the toe, and remains there, --(heart toe) 
b. The blood goes to the toe then back to the heart, —(heart toe heart) 
c. The blood goes to the toe, then to the lungs, then to the heart, --(heart 
toe lung heart) 
d. The blood goes to the lungs first, then to the toe, then back to the 
heart, --(heart lung toe heart) 
e. The blood goes to the toe, then to the heart, then to the lungs, then 
back to the heart, --(double circulation) 
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4. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the exercising 
muscle groups? 
a. it remains about the same as during rest 
b. it shuts off entirely 
c. it decreases slightly 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the major muscle groups do not require blood flow 
5. Going from rest to activity, what happens to the blood flow to the brain? 
a. it remains about the same as during rest 
b. it is shut off entirely 
c. it decreases substantially 
d. it increases substantially 
e. the brain does not usually require blood flow 
6. Adrenaline is a drug produced by the human body and is released during 
instances of fear or surprise; what is one effect this drug has? 
a. it constricts blood vessels in the intestinal region 
b. it dilates blood vessels in the intestinal region 
c. it constricts blood vessels in the leg muscles 
d. it constricts blood vessels leading to the brain 
e. it dilates blood vessels to the sex organs 
7. When moving from rest to exercise, heart rate should 
a. increase 
b. decrease 
c. remain the same 
d. decrease substantially, then increase 
e. increase or decrease depending on your level of fitness 
8. Where does oxygen go after it enters your lungs? 
a. air tubes from the lungs carry oxygen throughout the body 
b. blood in vessels carries oxygen from the lungs through the heart 
c. air tubes carry oxygen from the lungs through the heart 
d. blood in vessels carries oxygen directly to the body 
e. the oxygen remains in the lungs and is then exhaled 
9. Arteries are vessels in the body that: 
a. transport air from the lungs to the heart. 
b. transport air from the lungs to other parts of the body. 
c. transport blood both to and from the heart. 
d. transport blood to the heart. 
e. transport blood away from the heart. 
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10. Veins are vessels in the body that: 
a. have higher blood pressure than arteries. 
b. have lower blood pressure than arteries. 
c. have generally the same blood pressure as arteries. 
d. usually have no blood pressure in them at all. 
e. have higher blood pressure in them if they are located in the top 
half of the body. 
For questions 11 through 14, mark "A" on your answer sheet if the statement 
is TRUE, and "B" if the statement is false. 
11. A function of the heart is to filter impurities from the blood. 
12. A function of the heart is to create blood. 
13. A function of the heart is to pump blood. 
14. A function of the heart is to store blood. 
15. What does the internal structure of the human heart look like? (as above) 
a. figure "a" 
b. figure "b" 
c. figure "c" 
d. figure "d" 
e. figure "e" 
141 
16. What is the relationship in blood pressure between arteries and veins? 
a. they have equal blood pressures 
b. arteries always have higher blood pressure 
c. veins always have higher blood pressure 
d. the vein pressure is higher only in a fit individual 
e. artery pressure will be greater only if the individual is engaging in 
exercise 
17. Concerning the characteristics of arteries and veins you discovered using 
the computer simulation, where do you think arteries and veins are found in 
the human body (in general)? Select from the cross-sections of the upper leg 
shown below. 
•vein 
0 
0 O. 
vein 
ve n 
artery 
artery 
vein 
Femur (bone) 
Femur (bone) 
artery 
vein 
0' •vein 
•Femur (bone) 
artery 
Femur (bone) 
vein 
artery 
vein 
Femur (bone) 
vein 
0 
"artery 
18. Blood in some blood vessels of the body is high in oxygen. Blood in these 
vessels contain about what percent oxygen? 
a. 20% d. 80% 
b. 40% e. 95% 
c. 60% 
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Definition: stroke volume = the amount of blood pumped in one heartbeat 
19. When moving from rest to exercise, stroke volume should 
a. increase 
b. decrease 
c. remain the same 
d. decrease substantially, then increase 
e. increase or decrease depending on your level of fitness 
20. At rest, a well trained runner will have 
a. a lower stroke volume than an unfit person. 
b. a higher heart rate than an unfit person. 
c. a lower heart rate than an unfit person. 
d. a higher maximal heart rate than an unfit person. 
e. both a and c are correct. 
21. At rest, an unfit individual will have 
a. the same blood pressure as an athlete. 
b. slightly lower blood pressure than an athlete. 
c. much lower blood pressure than an athlete. 
d. higher blood pressure than an athlete. 
e. almost no blood pressure at all. 
Definition: cardiac output = (heart rate) X (volume of blood pumped per 
heartbeat). 
22. How does cardiac output change when you go from a resting state to a state 
of activity? 
a. it increases 
b. it decreases slightly 
c. it decreases substantially 
d. it remains the same 
e. it changes, but the direction is dependent upon the level of fitness 
23. How is cardiac output different between a fit and unfit person when at 
rest? 
a. cardiac output is about the same for both 
b. cardiac output is greater for the unfit person 
c. cardiac output is greater for the fit person 
d. different, but the direction is dependent upon gender 
e. different, but the direction is dependent upon age 
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24. How is cardiac output different between a fit and unfit person when 
exercising? 
a. cardiac output is the same for both 
b. cardiac output is greater for the unfit person 
c. cardiac output is greater for the fit person 
d. different, but the direction is dependent upon your gender 
e. different, but the direction is dependent upon your age 
25. Athletes exercise their heart as well as other muscle groups. What capacity 
might you see increase in their cardiovascular system? 
a. stroke volume 
b. breathing frequency 
c. cardiac output 
d. breathing rate and cardiac output 
e. cardiac output and stroke volume 
26. If two individuals are jogging at the same pace, and they both have the 
same cardiac output, are both individuals equally fit? 
a. if they have the same cardiac output, they must be equally fit 
b. not necessarily, the more fit individual could have higher heart rate 
and lower stroke volume 
c. not necessarily, the more fit individual could have lower heart rate 
and higher stroke volume 
d. not necessarily, the more fit individual could have lower heart rate 
and lower stroke volume 
e. not necessarily, the more fit individual could have lower heart rate 
and higher blood pressure 
27. In the atria of the heart, would you find blood that is relatively high in 
oxygen or low in oxygen? 
a. low 
b. high 
c. high or low, depending on which atrium 
d. a mixture of high and low 
e. blood does not enter the atria 
28. How many chambers are there in the human heart? 
a. one chamber 
b. two chambers 
c. three chambers 
d. four chambers 
e. five chambers 
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29. If an excessive amount of metabolic wastes are found in the blood sample 
of a hospital patient, what kind of a medical test might be done to find the 
source of the problem? 
a. an electrocardiograph of the heart 
b. brain scan 
c. kidney analysis 
d. x-ray of the lungs 
e. analysis of fallopian tubes 
30. This is a diagram of an amphibian heart. What is one drawback in having 
this type of heart? 
a. the blood pressure in an amphibian is always high 
b. a mixture of half oxygenated and half de-oxygenated blood circulates 
through the body 
c. the lungs receive only half the volume of blood they would if the heart was 
the same structure as the human's 
d. this structure provides no way for blood to circulate through the lungs 
e. blood sometimes reverses it's flow inside the heart 
